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This thesis consists of three chapters within the broad field of international 
trade. All three essays are self-contained and can be read independently of the 
others. They include: (i) Do Exports Respond to Exchange Rate Changes? 
Inference from China's Exchange Rate Reform; (ii) Exchange Rates and 
Export Structure; and (iii) When Trade Discourages Political Favoritism: 
Evidence from China. 
 
The first chapter revisits the exchange rate disconnect puzzle by using 
monthly data and exploiting the unexpected exchange rate reform in China as 
a natural experiment. The difference-in-differences estimation uncovers a 
negative and statistically significant effect of a currency appreciation on 
exports: a 1% currency appreciation is found to cause total exports to fall by 
1.61%. We find no trade diversion by Chinese exporters after the currency 
appreciation, both intensive-margin and extensive margin effects of exchange 
rate changes on exports, and heterogeneous effects across regions, firms and 
industries/products. 
 
The second chapter studies whether changes in the exchange rate affect a 
country’s export structure, using an arguably exogenous sudden appreciation 
of renminbi on July 21, 2005 as the main source of identification. Employing 
combined regression discontinuity and difference-in-differences approach, we 
show that China’s export structure became more similar to that of the 
developed countries after the currency appreciation. We also find that the 
vii 
 
majority of the appreciation effect comes from the inter-firm resource 
reallocation rather than the inter-region or intra-firm resource reallocation. 
 
The last chapter empirically investigates if trade leads to market reallocation 
away from politically favored but unproductive firms. This paper finds that 
tariff reductions after China’s WTO accession induced a 2.5% percentage-
point decline in the SOE output share and reduced the standard deviation of 
firm productivity by 1.4% between 2001 and 2005. The likelihood of SOE exit 
was related more to political affiliation than to performance: the SOEs 
affiliated with county and township governments were the worst hit, while 
those affiliated with higher-level governments were barely affected. Our 
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Do Exports Respond to Exchange Rate Changes? 
Inference from China’s Exchange Rate Reform 
1.1 Introduction 
“Japanese exports could be badly hurt by the yen’s recent rapid rise, Mr. 
Gaishi Hiraiwa, chairman of the Keidanren, the country's federation of 




“In a weekend interview, Finance Minister Guido Mantega stated flatly 
that Brazil ‘will not let the real appreciate.’ A strong Brazilian real, Mr. 




    Government officials and commercial circles across the world are 
concerned about the severe consequences of a currency appreciation on 
exports and domestic production, as exemplified by the above quotes. 
However, academic studies show that the exchange rate movement is largely 
disconnected from fundamentals such as exports (this is referred to as the 
exchange rate disconnect puzzle. See Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000).
3
 For 
example, Dekle, Jeong and Ryoo (2010) find that the elasticity of exports with 
respect to the exchange rate is not statistically different from zero for every 
                                               
1  See "Japanese fear rising yen will hurt exports" by Financial Times 
(http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/ap/academic/) Access date: October 9 2012 
2 See "Brazil Faces Currency Appreciation After Fed Move -Bradesco" by The Wall Street 
Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120920-709858.html) Access date: October 9 
2012 
3 Papers linking import prices to exchange rates include Goldberg and Knetter (1997) and 
Campa and Goldberg (2005, 2010), among others. 
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G-7 country for the period of 1982–1997.4 The contrasting views between 
political/commercial circles and academia present an interesting research 
question: do exports respond to exchange rate changes? 
    Our study contributes to the aforementioned debate by revisiting the 
empirical evidence in two new manners. Firstly, in contrast to the yearly data 
that are commonly used in the literature, our empirical analysis uses monthly 
data, which gives us more variations with which to calculate the effect of 
exchange rate changes on exports. Secondly, and more importantly, instead of 
resorting to a micro-level analysis (i.e., using firm-destination or 
firm-product-destination data) as in some of the recently emerged literature,
5 
we stick to the macro-level analysis but explore a natural experiment setting in 
China to carefully address the estimation biases due to the endogeneity 
associated with exchange rate changes (i.e., omitted variables bias and reverse 
causality).
 6
 Specifically, the Chinese government unexpectedly revalued its 
currency against the US dollar on July 21, 2005, which resulted in an 
immediate appreciation of 2.1% (for more description of the episode, see 
Section 1.3). Such an exogenous shock provides us with an opportunity to 
consistently estimate the effect of exchange rate changes on exports by 
comparing China’s monthly exports to the U.S. (the treatment group) with 
                                               
4 See also Kenen and Rodrik (1986), Hooper, Johnson and Marquez (2000), and Colacelli 
(2009) for similar findings. 
5 See for example, Dekle, Jeong, and Ryoo, (2010); Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012); 
Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2014); Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro, and Vichyanond (2013). 
6 Understanding the aggregate-level response is important for both policy and academic 
purpose. Firstly, whether total exports respond to exchange rate movement or not is what 
concerns policy makers and its answer has implication for other monetary policies like interest 
rate, current account management, etc. Secondly, as one of the major puzzles in international 
macroeconomics, the small elasticity of export to exchange rate has generated a vast number 
of studies to understand the underlying reasons and to evaluate the potential welfare impacts 
of related policies (e.g., Duarte, 2003). However, there is still no consensus regarding the 




those to other countries (the control group) before and after the currency 
revaluation, or a difference-indifferences estimation specification. Meanwhile, 
we also control for those potential omitted variables implied by the 
micro-level analysis, such as producer dispersion (Dekle, Jeong, and Ryoo, 
2010; Berman, Martin, and Mayer, 2012) and import value (Amiti, Itskhoki 
and Konings, 2014). 
    We find a negative and statistically significant effect of a currency 
appreciation on exports. In terms of economic magnitude, a 1% currency 
appreciation is found to cause total exports to fall by 1.61%. Given that China 
exported US$1.904 trillion worth of goods in 2011, a 1% currency 
appreciation means a US$30.65 billion decrease in Chinese exports to the 
U.S., a significant number, which may justify the concerns by government 
officials and exporters. Our estimation results are robust to various checks on 
the validity of the DID estimation, including the control for country-specific 
month effects and country-specific linear time trend, a check on the 
pre-treatment differential trends between the treatment and control groups, a 
placebo test using homogeneous goods as the regression sample, and a 
difference-in-difference-in-differences (triple difference) estimation. 
Meanwhile, we find that the currency appreciation did not lead to trade 
diversion to other countries by Chinese exporters, suggesting that the fall in 
exports resulted in substantial exits of Chinese exporters from the exporting 
market. Moreover, we find the export response to exchange rate changes to be 
more prominent in China's coastal regions, among Chinese state-owned 
enterprises, within time sensitive industries, and for non-necessities. 
4 
 
    To understand how exchange rate changes affect exports, we extend the 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model to incorporate the role of exchange rate 
movements (See the Appendix 1 for details). It is found that the effect of 
exchange rate changes on the aggregate export value can be decomposed into 
two parts, the intensive and the extensive margins. Specifically, the currency 
appreciation increases the final prices of exports in foreign markets as well as 
decreases the free on board (FOB) export price due to incomplete 
pass-through, which causes FOB export revenues to fall (the intensive-margin 
effect). In the meantime, as exporters differ in their production efficiency, 
some less productive exporters find that their export profits become negative 
and hence choose to exit the foreign markets (the extensive-margin effect). By 
exploring our comprehensive data, we find supports for both intensive-margin 
and extensive-margin effects, that is, fewer firms export and for continuing 
exporters, each exports less, after a currency appreciation. 
In addition to the aforementioned macro-level literature on the exchange 
rate puzzle, our study is related to recent studies using firm-level data to 
examine the effect of exchange rate changes on exports. For example, Dekle, 
Jeong, and Ryoo (2010) use panel data of Japanese exporters for the period of 
1982-1997 and find the exchange-rate elasticity of exports to be statistically 
significant and have a value of -0.77. Drawing on French firm-level data for 
the period of 1995-2005, Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) uncover the 
heterogeneous reaction of exporters to real exchange rate changes: 
high-performance exporters increase their markup but reduce their export 
volume in response to a currency depreciation. Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings 
(2014), using Belgian firm-product level data, uncover that larger exporters 
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also import a large amount of intermediate inputs, thereby offsetting exchange 
rate effects on their marginal costs and explaining the low pass-through of 
exchange rate changes. Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro, and Vichyanond (2013) 
study the effect of exchange rate shocks on export behavior (including the 
adjustments of prices, quantities, product scope, and sales distribution across 
products) of multi-product firms. The departure of our work from these studies 
is that firstly we look at the aggregate export response as those in the previous 
literature on the exchange rate disconnect puzzle, and secondly we use a 
quasi-natural experiment setting to carefully control for the endogeneity 
problems. 
Our work is also related to the literature on China's exchange rate 
movement. Using the same data as ours, Tang and Zhang (2012) find a 
significant effect of exchange rate appreciation on the exit and entry of 
Chinese exporters as well as on product churning. Li, Ma, Xu (2013) use 
detailed Chinese firm-level data to examine the effect of exchange rate 
changes on firms' exporting behavior, such as export volume, export price, the 
probability of exporting, and product scope. The main difference between our 
work and this literature lies in the identification strategy: while we explore the 
currency revaluation in July 2005 as an exogenous variation, these papers 
mostly rely on the panel fixed-effect estimation. 
 
1.2 Estimation Strategy 
1.2.1 Data 
Our study draws on data from two sources. The first one is the China customs 
data from 2000 (the earliest year of the data) to 2006 (the most recent year the 
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authors have access to). This data set covers a universe of all monthly import 
and export transactions by Chinese exporters and importers, specifically 
including product information (HS 8-digit level classification), trade value, 
identity of Chinese importers and exporters, and import and export 
destinations. The second data source is the International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) maintained by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), from which we 
obtain the monthly bilateral nominal exchange rates between China and other 
foreign countries as well as CPIs for the 2000-2006 period. 
    After combining the China customs data with the IFS data and excluding 
countries without monthly export value, import value and nominal exchange 
rate, we end up with a total of 88 countries. We then go through a few steps of 
data cleaning. First, we exclude 30 countries (including 9 oil-producing 
countries) whose currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar in some years 
during our sample but unpegged in other years (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995, 
for the same practice). Second, we exclude Hong Kong and Macao, which are 




    Table 1.1 lists the 56 countries used in our regression analysis. During 
our sample period, these 56 countries capture the majority of Chinese total 
exports, i.e., around 70%. However, one may be concerned that the 
revaluation of the Chinese currency coincides with a large share of exports 
going to countries other than those covered in the regression analysis, which 
would lead to an overestimation of the effect of the exchange rate change. To 
check such a possibility, we ploy in Figure 1.1 the share of Chinese total 
                                               




exports covered in our regression analysis by month throughout the sample 
period. It is found that this number hooves around 70% and more importantly, 
there is no discontinuity at the time of the revaluation of the Chinese currency. 
These findings largely dispel the concern that our estimates may be biased due 
to a trade diversion to countries out of our regression sample. 
    Of 55 non-U.S. countries, none has its currency pegged to the U.S. dollar. 
Hence, we have one treatment country, the U.S., and 55 countries in the 
control group. Our final regression sample contains 56 × 84=4,704 
country-month observations. 
 
1.2.2 China's Exchange Rate Reform in July 2005 
Timeline. After the financial crackdown in 1994, China adopted a decade-old 
fixed exchange rate regime, in which its currency (RMB) was pegged to the 
U.S. dollar at an exchange rate of 8.28. At 19:00 of July 21, 2005 (Beijing 
time), the People's Bank of China (PBOC, the central bank of China) suddenly 
announced a revaluation of the Chinese currency against the U.S. dollar, 
which was set to be traded at an exchange rate of 8.11 immediately, i.e., an 
appreciation of about 2.1%. Meanwhile, the PBOC announced its 
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime and that it would allow RMB 
to be traded flexibly with a reference basket of currencies with the target for 
RMB set by the PBOC every day. Figure 1.2 displays the trends of exchange 
rates of the U.S. dollar and other currencies against Renminbi during 
2000-2006 (see Table 1.1 for the 55 other countries used in the analysis).
8
 It is 
                                               
8 The pairwise correlation between the Renminbi-US dollar exchange rate and Renminbi 




clear that there was a sudden drop in the exchange rate of the Chinese 
currency against US dollar in July 2005, and a steady and continuous decrease 
after that. By the end of 2006, the Renminbi had appreciated by about 5.5% 
against the US dollar. In the meantime, after a period of two years 
depreciation, the Renminbi remained quite stable against other currencies 
between 2004 and 2006. 
    Exogeneity. Despite the fact that the revaluation of the Chinese currency 
happened during a period of enormous international pressures on the Chinese 
government to appreciate its undervalued currency, the timing of the change is 
widely considered as "unexpected". There is much anecdotal evidence as well 
as academic studies supporting this statement. First, foreign pressures on the 
Renminbi for an appreciation had existed for more than two years, and the 
Chinese government regarded its exchange rate policy as a matter of China's 
sovereignty and rejected any political pressure on this issue. For example, on 
June 26, 2005, China's Premier Wen Jiabao said at the Sixth Asia-Europe 
Finance Ministers Meeting in Tianjin that China would "independently 
determine the modality, timing and content of reforms" and rejected foreign 
pressures for an immediate shift in the nation's currency regime.
 9
 One day 
later, Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the PBOC, said that it was too soon to 
drop the decade-old fixed exchange rate regime and that he had no plans to 
discuss the currency issue at the weekend meeting of the global central 
bankers in Basel, Switzerland.
 10
 On July 15, one week before the exchange 
                                               
9  See "Chinese premier warns against yuan reform haste" by the Wall Street Journal 
(http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111975074805069620,00.html) Access date: October 9 
2012 
10 See "China's Zhou Says `Time Is Not Ripe' to Drop Yuan Peg to Dollar" by Bloomberg 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a7n6HBTVapBA&refer=hom
e) Access date: October 9 2012 
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rate system reform, the PBOC denied that it was planning to announce a 
revaluation of its currency.
 11
 On July 19, even two days before the reform, 
the PBOC still insisted that it would continue to keep the exchange rate stable 
and at a reasonable and balanced level in the second half of the year.
 12
 
    Second, as elaborated by Yuan (2012), there was division in Chinese 
policy makers regarding whether the Chinese currency should be appreciated 
during that period. Specifically, the Ministry of Commerce opposed the 
currency appreciation (so as to maintain the competitiveness of China’s export 
sector), while the other three central governmental agencies, the People’s 
Bank of China, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the 
Ministry of Finance, all proposed revaluing the Chinese currency. 
    Third, after the reform, both the domestic and international media 
responded to the revaluation as completely unexpected. For example, CNN 
reported the episode as "The surprise move by China, ...".
 13
 The Financial 
Times wrote in its famous "Lex Column" on July 22, 2005 that "China likes to 
do things [in] its own way. After resisting pressure to revalue the Renminbi for 
so long, Beijing has moved sooner than even John Snow, the U.S. Treasury 
secretary, expected".
14
 On July 22, 2005 the BBC Worldwide Monitoring said 
that "The People's Bank of China unexpectedly announced last night that the 
                                               
11  See "Central bank denies revaluation in August" by People's Daily 
(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/17/eng20050717_196621.html) Access date: 
October 9 2012 
12 See "China to keep RMB exchange rate basically stable: central bank" by People's Daily 
(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/20/eng20050720_197148.html) Access date: 
October 9 2012 
13  See "World events rattle futures" by CNN (http://money.cnn.com/2005/07/21/ 
markets/stockswatch/index.htm) Access date: October 9 2012 
14  See "Renminimal THE LEX COLUMN" by Financial Times 
(http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/ap/academic/) Access date: October 9 2012 
10 
 




Fourth, academic studies also imply that the change in the exchange rate 
policy in July 2005 is unexpected. For example, Eichengreen and Tong (2011) 
study the impact of the Renminbi revaluation announcement on firm value in 
the 2005–2010 period. Using the change of stock prices before and after the 
announcement of the revaluation for 6,050 firms in 44 countries, they find that 
the Renminbi appreciation significantly increased firm values for those 
exporting to China while significantly decreased firm values for those 
competing with Chinese firms in their home markets, suggesting the 
exogeneity of the policy change.  
 
1.2.3 Estimation Specification 
The benchmark model (or its variants) used in the literature to investigate the 
response of exports to exchange rate is
16
 
                    
,lnln ittiitit eV                  
(1.1) 
where itV  is the export value from Home country to foreign country i  at 
time t ; ite  is the nominal exchange rate of foreign country i 's currency 
against the Home currency at time t ; i  and t  are the foreign country and 
time fixed effects, respectively; and it  is the error term. 
                                               
15  See "Hong Kong daily says exchange rate reform advantageous overall" by BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring (http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/ap/academic/) 
Access date: October 9 2012 
16
 For example, Kenen and Rodrik (1986) and Perée and Steinherr (1989) use a time series 
version of Equation (1.1) and find that the estimated coefficient   is smaller than 1 in most 
of their sample countries. Colacelli (2009) uses the same specification in a sample of 136 




    However, a crucial assumption to obtain an unbiased estimate of   in 
Equation (1.1) is that conditional on all the control variables, exchange rate is 
uncorrelated with the error term, i.e., 
                    
  .0,|ln  tiititeE                   (1.2) 
    It is reasonable to doubt that this identifying assumption holds. For 
example, Dekle, Jeong and Ryoo (2010) show that producer heterogeneity is 
an important missing variable in the estimation of Equation (1.1). Meanwhile, 
export transactions involve buying and selling currencies, which in aggregate 
may influence the determination of the exchange rate. The violation of the 
identifying assumption (1.2) (due to the omitted variables bias and reverse 
causality) may explain why the literature only uncovered small values of  , 
which should theoretically be bigger than 1.
17
 
To improve the identification, we use monthly data instead of the 
commonly-used yearly data, which precludes any potential omitted variables 
that do not vary monthly. Secondly, and more importantly, we use the sudden 
and unexpected exchange rate reform in China in July 2005 to conduct a 
difference-in-differences estimation. Specifically, we compare exports to the 
U.S. before and after July 2005 with exports to other countries during the 
same period. The DID estimation specification is: 
         




where iTreatment  is the treatment status indicator, which takes value 1 if the 
country is the U.S. (the treatment group) and 0 otherwise (the control group); 
and tPost  is the post-appreciation period indicator, which takes value 1 if it 
                                               
17 See Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) for the proof. 
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is after July 2005 and 0 otherwise. To adjust the potential serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity, we use the robust standard error clustered at the 
country level (see Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). 
Note that in the pre-revaluation period exchange rates of the Chinese 
currency (RMB) against other non-U.S. countries (say for example, the UK 
pound) were set by the cross rate between the dollar-RMB and the 
pound-dollar rate. If such approach was still applied and the pound-dollar rate 
did not change much in the post-revaluation period, the change in the 
pound-RMB exchange rate was then entirely driven by the change in the 
dollar-RMB rate, making our DID estimation strategy invalid. Two pieces of 
evidence help us relieve such concern. Firstly, after the revaluation in July 
2005, the RMB was traded flexibly with a reference basket of currencies with 
the rate set by the PBOC every day; in other words, the cross-rate approach 
was largely not applied in the post-revaluation period. Secondly, as shown in 
Figure 1.2, the trade-weighted exchange rate of the RMB against other 
currencies remained quite stable in a two-year window of the revaluation time, 
and similar results are found for individual countries (results available upon 
request). 
    The identifying assumption associated with the DID estimation 
specification (1.3) is that conditional on a whole list of controls ( ti  , ), our 
regressor of interest, ti PostTreatment  , is uncorrelated with the error term, 
it , i.e., 
             
  .0,|  tiitti PostTreatmentE              (1.4) 
13 
 
As discussed in Section 1.3, the revaluation of the Chinese currency 
against the US dollar in July 2005 was highly unexpected, and therefore can 
be considered largely as an exogenous shock to Chinese exporters, which 
implies the satisfaction of the identifying assumption (1.4). Nonetheless, we 
conduct a battery of robustness checks to corroborate the claim that the 
identifying assumption (1.4) holds. These include a control for 
country-specific month effects and a country-specific linear time trend, a 
check on the pre-treatment differential trends between the treatment and 
control groups, a placebo test using homogeneous goods as the regression 
sample, and a difference-in-difference-in-differences (triple difference) 
estimation. For details, see Section 1.5.3. 
 
1.3 Empirical Findings 
1.3.1 Graphical Presentation 
We start with a visual examination of the difference between Chinese exports 
to the treatment group (i.e., the U.S.) and the control group (i.e., other 55 
countries) over time in Figure 1.3. The solid vertical line marks the time of 
China's exchange rate reform (i.e., July 2005), while the dashed vertical line 
represents one year before the reform. Arguably, the U.S. vs. non-U.S. export 
differential exhibits a four-stage pattern over our sample period (i.e., 
2000-2006): from 2000 to late 2001, the export differential was quite stable; 
then it started a clear downward trend until the decline flattened out around 
mid-2004, or one year before the exchange rate reform in July 2005; and 
finally after the reform, Chinese exports to the U.S. decreased sharply against 
Chinese exports to the rest of our sample countries. 
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    The above export-differential pattern coincides with that of the exchange 
rate differential displayed in Figure 1.2. For example, other currencies started 
to appreciate against the Chinese currency in early 2002 and stabilized around 
early 2004, during which period Chinese currency remained pegged to the US 
dollar. Between 2004 and 2006, while these other currencies stayed quite 
stable against the Chinese currency (despite of some ups and downs), US 
dollar began to continuously depreciate against Chinese currency after China's 
exchange rate reform in July 2005. 
A few results emerge from these two figures. First, a currency 
appreciation has a visible, negative effect on exports as demonstrated by the 
negative correlation between the U.S. vs. non-U.S. export differential and their 
currency differential. Second, there is no clear differential pattern between U.S. 
and non-U.S. exports one year before the exchange rate reform, indicating that 
the reform is plausibly exogenous to exporters. Third, while after the reform in 
July 2005, the US dollar started to continuously depreciate against Chinese 
currency, other currencies remained quite stable throughout the period of 
2004–2006, which justifies the use of the difference-in-differences estimation. 
However, as we include all sample periods in our analysis, one may be 
concerned that the results from the comparison of U.S. exports before and 
after the exchange rate reform with non-U.S. exports during the same period 
could be driven by the negative correlation between exports and currency 
changes happened during the period of 2002-2004. To address this concern, in 





1.3.2 Main Results 
Regression results corresponding to Equation (1.3) are reported in Column 1 
of Table 1.2. It is found that ti PostTreatment   is negative and statistically 
significant, implying that the appreciation of the Chinese currency against US 
dollar significantly reduced Chinese exports to the U.S. Meanwhile, the fall in 
exports is found to be substantial, i.e., the reform caused Chinese exports to 
the U.S. to fall by 17.6%. 
    In Column 2 of Table 1.2, we include monthly imports (in logarithm 
form), as the reform may make imports to China cheaper, and hence affect the 
production and exporting behavior of Chinese exporters (i.e., through the use 
of imported intermediate inputs and the increased domestic competition by 
imported final goods; see Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings, 2014 for an 
elaboration on this point). In Column 3 of Table 1.2, we further include a 
measure of producer heterogeneity (i.e., the mean of export value divided by 
its standard deviation), the omission of which has been argued to seriously 
bias previous estimates in the literature (see Dekle, Jeong and Ryoo, 2010). 
Clearly, we find a quite similar negative estimate with the inclusion of these 
two additional controls. 
Despite the fact that the reform was exogenous to Chinese exporters, one 
may be concerned that the decision to appreciate the currency in July 2005 by 
the Chinese central government was strategic. In other words, the drop in 
exports to the U.S. following the currency revaluation in July 2005 could have 
been driven by the U.S.-specific month effect, specifically, U.S.-July effect. 
To address such concern, we further include the country-specific 
month-of-year effect (i.e., ,ti M  where tM  is a month indicator such as 
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January, February, ，December), and the identification for example comes 
now from the comparison of U.S.-vs.-non-U.S. in July 2005 with 
U.S.-vs.-non-U.S. in July 2004. As shown in column 4 of Table 1.2, our main 
results regarding the effect of exchange rate on exports barely change in either 
statistical significance or magnitude, suggesting that our results are not driven 
by the country-specific month effect. 
 
1.3.3 Robustness Checks 
In this sub-section, we present a battery of robustness checks on our 
aforementioned estimation results. 
    Control for country-specific linear time trend. One concern is that it 
seems other currencies also started a depreciation trend against the Chinese 
currency after January 2005, continuing even after July 2005, the time of the 
exchange rate reform. To address the concern that our estimates may be 
contaminated by these similar depreciation time trends, we saturate the model 
with the inclusion of country-specific linear time trend, .ti   Hence, our 
identification comes from the discontinuity in the time trend caused by the 
revaluation of the Chinese currency against the US dollar in July 2005, a 
strategy similar to the regression discontinuity method. Despite of a significant 
drop in its magnitude, ti PostTreatment   
remains negative and statistically 
significant (Column 1 of Table 1.3). 
    Check on pre-reform differential trends. A corollary of the identifying 
assumption (1.4) is that exports to the U.S. and other countries followed 
similar patterns before the revaluation in July 2005. Figure 1.3 clearly shows 
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that U.S. vs. non-U.S. export differential was quite stable one year before the 
reform, but sharply declined right after the reform. To establish these results 
more formally, we first divide the whole 2000-2006 period into four periods 
(i.e., before July 2004, July 2004–June 2005, July 2005, and August 2005 
onward), and then construct interactions between iTreatment  
and indicators 
of the three periods with July 2005 being the omitted category. The regression 
results are reported in Column 2 of Table 1.3. Consistent with the findings in 
Figure 1.3, the coefficient of 2005/062004/07 iTreatment is highly 
insignificant, further confirming that U.S. exports and non-U.S. exports had 
similar patterns one year before the reform. Meanwhile, 
2004/07BeforeTreatmenti  is positive and statistically significant, 
consistent with the fact that during this period there was a depreciation of the 
Chinese currency against other non-U.S. countries in our regression sample. 
Finally, our main results, the coefficient of ,2005/08 onwardTreatmenti   
remains negative and statistically significant.
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A sub-sample of the 2004-2006 period. As discussed in the Section 
1.5.1, there is a concern that our findings of the negative impact of exchange 
rate appreciation on exports could be driven by the movement in earlier 
months, i.e., 2002-2004. Meanwhile, the exchange rate of currencies other 
than the US dollar remained quite stable against the Chinese currency during 
the period of 2004-2006, making the difference-in-differences analysis using 
                                               
18  Interestingly, the coefficients of onwardTreatmenti 2005/08 and 
2004/07BeforeTreatmenti   have similar magnitudes but opposite signs, as the former 
captures the appreciation effect of the dollar-RMB rate with other exchange rates unchanged , 
while the latter reflects the depreciation effect of the Chinese currency against other non-U.S. 
countries with the dollar-RMB rate unchanged. 
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just the data of 2004-2006 more appealing. To these ends, we conduct a 
robustness check by restricting our analysis to the sample of 2004-2006. 
Regression results are reported in Column 3 of Table 1.3. Despite of a drop in 
the estimated magnitude, ti PostTreatment  remains negative and statistically 
significant, implying the robustness of our previous findings. 
    A placebo test using homogeneous goods. The identification from our 
difference-in-differences estimation comes from the fact that the exported 
goods are priced differently across the treatment and control groups, and hence 
the appreciation of the treatment country's currency makes the exported goods 
more expensive in the treatment country, thus producing a fall in total exports 
to that country, given that the situations in the control group remain 
unchanged. However, if the exported goods are charged with the same prices 
across countries and hence the export prices are detached from the exchange 
rate, then we should not spot any significant effects from the 
difference-in-differences estimation. One example of these special exported 
goods are commodities traded on the exchange market, or the group of 
homogeneous goods as classified by Rauch (1999). Using Rauch (1999)'s 
classification, we divide the whole set of Chinese exported goods into two 
groups, differentiated and homogeneous goods, and then conduct a placebo 
test using the sample of homogeneous goods. The regression results are 
reported in Column 4 of Table 1.3. Consistent with our argument, the 
coefficient of ti PostTreatment  is highly insignificant, lending further 
support to our identification. 
    A difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation. Further exploring 
the difference between differentiated and homogeneous goods, we conduct a 
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difference-in-difference-in-differences (or triple difference) estimation. 
Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
,ln ' igtitgtigigtgtiigt XatedDifferentiPostTreatmentV  
(1.5) 
where g  indicates the group of the exported goods, i.e., differentiated or 
homogeneous goods group; 
gatedDifferenti is an indicator of the 
differentiated goods group; and 
igtX  is a vector of controls (i.e., the logarithm 
of imports and producer heterogeneity).
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The beauty of the triple difference estimation is that it allows us to 
include a full set of the country-group fixed effects 
ig , the group-time fixed 
effects 
gt , and the country-time fixed effects it .
20
 For example, the 
inclusion of the country-month fixed effects means controlling for all observed 
or unobserved time-invariant and time varying country characteristics, which 
are the main concerns violating our above difference-in-differences identifying 
assumption (1.4). As shown in Column 5 of Table 1.3, the triple interaction 
term is found to be negative and statistically significant. This further 
reinforces our aforementioned difference-in-differences estimation results, i.e., 
our findings are not biased due to some omitted time-varying country 
characteristics. 
                                               
19 Note that the number of observations increase as the regression unit is now at the 
group-country-month level. 
20 In estimating the Equation(1.5), we first difference exports across the two groups within a 
country-month cell, and then estimate the resulting double-difference equation: 
         
    
,~
~~
ln ittiittiit XPostTreatmentV    




ln igtit VV   
Otherwise, we 
encounter the computational burdens as the original triple difference equation involves too 
many dummy variables, i.e., 704,48456   country-time dummies, 112256   






1.3.4 Exchange Rate Elasticity 
Although in the previous sections we have established that the exchange rate 
reform (or the currency appreciation) has a negative effect on exports, it is 
interesting to know the exchange rate elasticity of exports. To this end, we use 
the exchange rate reform in China to construct an instrumental variable for the 




    We start with the estimation of Equation (1.1) without instrumenting the 
exchange rate in column 1 of Table 1.4. Though statistically significant, the 
estimated coefficient of exchange rate has only a value of -0.454, a magnitude 
similar to those found in the literature (e.g., Colacelli, 2009). 
    The instrumental variable estimation results are reported in Column 3 of 
Table 1.4. The first-stage results (not included here but available upon request) 
show a positive and statistical relation between the instrument 
( ti PostTreatment  ) and the regressor of interest ( ctERln ). And the F-test of 
excluded instruments in the first-stage has a value of 27.02, substantially 
higher than the critical value 10 of the "safety zone" for strong instruments 
suggested by Straight and Stock (1997). These results suggest that our 
proposed instrument is both relevant and strong. 
    With respect to our central issue, the exchange rate, after being 
instrumented, still casts a negative and statistically significant impact on total 
exports. More importantly, there is a substantial increase in the estimated 
                                               
21 For the exclusion restriction to be hold, we need that the exchange rate reform affects 
exports value only through its effect on the bilateral exchange rate, and not through other 
changes in the economy that might be coincident with the exchange rate reform. 
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magnitude: a 1% appreciation causes total exports to fall by 1.61%, 
confirming the theoretical prediction that the exchange rate elasticity of 
exports is greater than 1 and the existence of a significant bias in the previous 
OLS estimations. Put the number into a real context: given that China 
exported US$1.904 trillion worth of goods in 2011, a 1% currency 
appreciation means a US$30.65 billion loss in China's export sector, a 
significant number justifying why government officials and businessmen are 
greatly concerned about the currency appreciation. 
In Column 2 and 4 of Table 1.4, we replace the nominal exchange rate 
with the real exchange rate. Clearly, we still identify a statistically significant 
effect of exchange rate on total exports, although the magnitude of the IV 
estimate drops from -1.605 to -1.125. 
 
1.3.5 Trade Diversion 
From a policy viewpoint, it is important to know whether the fall in exports to 
the treatment group (i.e., the U.S.) after the currency appreciation causes a 
withdrawn by Chinese exporters from the exporting market or the diversion 
from the affected destination (i.e., the U.S.) to some unaffected destinations in 
our regression sample. If it is the latter, then for governments, the prospects 
after a currency appreciation may not be that gloomy. 
    Based on the premise that it is easier to divert exports to countries (such 
as other OECD countries) with similar consumer preference as those of the 
U.S., we conduct two exercises to shed light on the possibility of trade 
diversion. Firstly, we exclude OECD countries from our control group and 
re-estimate Equation (1.3). If there were trade diversion, we should expect a 
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smaller estimation coefficient. However, we find in Column 1 of Table 1.5 
that the coefficient of ti PostTreatment   slightly to -0.186 from -0.165 (in 
Column 4 of Table 1.2; with all countries in the regression), despite of the 
increase being statistically insignificant. 
    Secondly, we compare Chinese exports to OECD countries (excluding 
the U.S.) before and after the exchange rate reform with the corresponding 
exports to the rest of countries in our sample during the same period. If there 
were trade diversion, we should expect that following the appreciation of 
Chinese currency against the US dollar, Chinese exports to other OECD 
countries have increased relative to Chinese exports to other sample countries, 
given that these countries' currencies remained stable against Chinese currency 
during this period. However, as shown in Column 2 of Table 1.5, 
ti PostTreatment   is highly insignificant. 
These two exercises demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to 
support trade diversion hypothesis after the exchange rate reform, and much of 
the falls in Chinese exports to the U.S. are due to the exits of Chinese 
exporters from the exporting market. 
 
1.3.6 Mechanism 
While our objective is to investigate the export response to changes in the 
exchange rate at the macro-level, our customs data contain observations 
disaggregated at the firm-product-month-country level, which allows us to 
investigate some underlying mechanism about how currency appreciation 
affects total exports. In the Appendix 1, we show that the effect of exchange 
rate changes on aggregate exports operates on two margins, the intensive- and 
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the extensive-margins. Specifically, a currency appreciation causes the final 
price in the foreign market to increase and the FOB export price to decrease, 
due to an incomplete pass-through. The final price increase may reduce the 
demand, which, combined with the decreased FOB price, will reduce the total 
export revenue, damping the effect of the appreciation at the intensive margin. 
Moreover, the adverse effect of a currency appreciation is stronger for less 
productive exporters, making them unprofitable in and hence exit the foreign 
market (an extensive-margin effect). 
    The regression results are reported in Table 1.6. In Column 1-2, we 
investigate the extensive-margin effect, that is, regressing the total number of 
firms and the total number of HS-8 product categories exported to the U.S. on 
ti PostTreatment   along with a full set of controls. It is found that, consistent 
with our model featuring heterogeneous firms, the Chinese currency 
appreciation significantly reduced the number of total exporters and the 
number of HS-8 product categories, specifically, by 6.6% and 29.2%, 
respectively, in magnitude. 
    In column 3-5, we investigate the intensive-margin effect from different 
dimensions as suggested by the model. Specifically, we focus on the sample of 
surviving exporters (firms continuing to export after the currency appreciation) 
and regress the mean values of export price, export volume and export revenue 
at the firm-product-month-country level on ti PostTreatment  along with a 
full set of controls. Our model predicts that, due to incomplete pass-through, 
the appreciation of Renminbi will decrease the FOB export price. This 
prediction is confirmed by the estimate in Column 3, i.e., the appreciation 
brings down the price by about 1.3%, which is very significant both 
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statistically and economically. Also consistent with the model, the effect on 
export volume (shown in Column 4) is found to be negative, albeit not 
precisely estimated. The total intensive margin effect of the Renminbi 
appreciation is shown in column 5. Given the negative effects of the 
appreciation on the price and the volume, it is natural that the appreciation has 
strong negative impact on export revenue, i.e., a fall of 4.1%. 
In summary, we find support for both extensive-margin and 
intensive-margin effects of exchange rate movement on exports. 
 
1.3.7 Heterogeneous Effects 
In the last part of our empirical investigation, we examine possible 
heterogeneous effects across different regions (i.e., inland versus coastal 
regions), across different types of firms (i.e., state-owned enterprises versus 
private enterprises), and across different industries/products (i.e., time 
sensitive versus time insensitive industries; different product categories in the 
PPI basket). The estimation specification we use is the triple difference 
Equation (1.5), with different definitions of the group indicator in different 
investigations. 
    Coastal versus inland regions. We start in Column 1 of Table 1.7 the 
investigation of differential exports response to exchange rate changes 
between coastal and inland regions. The group indicator takes a value of 1 for 
coastal regions and 0 for inland regions. The triple interaction term is found to 
be negative and statistically significant, indicating that exports to U.S. fell 
more in coastal regions than in inland regions after the appreciation of the 
Chinese currency against the US dollar. One possible explanation is that as the 
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transport costs are lower in coastal regions, the initial cut-off productivity 
levels of exporting is lower in coastal regions than in inland regions. The 
currency appreciation increases the cut-off productivity levels of exporting in 
both coastal and inland regions, but as there are much weaker exporters in 
coastal regions, more exporters from coastal regions exit the exporting market 
than their counterparts from inland regions.
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    State-owned versus private enterprises. In Column 2 of Table 1.7, we 
investigate the possible different responses between state-owned enterprises 
and private enterprises, with the group variable indicating a state-owned 
enterprise. Clearly, we find that state-owned enterprises respond more to 
exchange rate changes than private enterprises, i.e., the former's exports fall 
more than the latter's. One possible explanation is that state-owned enterprises 
in China receive many subsidies from the governments (such as trade credit, 
export rebate, etc), making the cut-off productivity levels of exporting for 
state-owned enterprises lower than those for private enterprises. Then after the 
currency appreciation, some weaker state-owned enterprises are driven out of 
the exporting market, if the government subsidies remain rigid in the 
short-run. 
    Time sensitive versus time insensitive industries. Thirdly, we divide 
industries into two groups, time sensitive (assigned a value of 1 for the group 
indicator) and time insensitive industries (assigned a value of 0 for the group 
indicator), following the classification used by Djankov, Freund, and Pham 
(2013). Specifically, time sensitive industries are the three 2-digit 
manufacturing industries (i.e., office equipment, electric power machinery, 
                                               












and photographic equipment) having the highest probability of using air 
transport, whereas time insensitive industries are the three 2-digit 
manufacturing industries (i.e., textile yarns, cement, and plumbing fixtures) 
with the lowest probability (the probability was estimated by Hummels, 2001). 
As shown in Column 3 of Table 1.7, time sensitive industries experienced 
more of a fall in exports after the revaluation of exchange rate in July 2005 
than time insensitive industries. One possible explanation is that production 
and shipment are easier to adjust and hence more responsive to exchange rate 
movements in time sensitive industries than in time insensitive industries. 
Different product categories in the PPI basket. Finally, following 
Vermeulen et al. (2007), we group products into 6 categories used in the PPI 
basket (i.e., food products, non-food non-durable products, durable products, 
intermediate goods, energy, and capital goods) to examine whether there are 
differential appreciation effects. Regression results are reported in columns 
4-9 of Table 1.7. It is found that the currency appreciation had significant and 
negative effects on exports in non-food non-durable products, durable 
products, intermediate goods and capital goods, but insignificant effects in 
food products and energy. Intuitively, food and energy are necessities of life, 
which make them non-responsive to exchange rate changes. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
The effect of exchange rate changes on exports has attracted extensive 
attention from policy makers, commercial circles and academia. In this paper, 
we revisit the question of whether exports respond to exchange rate changes 
and contribute to the literature by carefully addressing the identification issues. 
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Specifically, we employ monthly, rather than yearly data usually used in the 
literature, to take advantage of more variations in the key variables. And to 
address the potential endogeneity problem in the estimation, we use the 
unexpected exchange rate regime switch by Chinese government in July 2005 
as a natural experiment. 
    The difference-in-differences estimation uncovers a statistically and 
economically significant and negative effect of a currency appreciation on 
exports. Specifically, our main estimation result shows that a 1% exchange 
rate appreciation decreases total exports by 1.61%, which, in the context of 
year 2011 China, represents a US$30.65 billion decrease in total exports. This 
negative effect is robust to various checks on the validity of the 
difference-in-differences estimation and other econometric concerns. 
Meanwhile, we do not find any trade diversion by Chinese exporters after the 
currency appreciation, but uncover both intensive-margin and 
extensive-margin effects of exchange rate changes on exports, and 




Chapter Two  
Exchange Rates and Export Structure 
2.1 Introduction 
Exchange rates have been an important tool of trade policies. A weaker 
currency is widely believed by politicians and government officials to stifle 
import competition, helping to relieve domestic political pressures from high 
unemployment rates and boosting the performance of export sectors, 
subsequently leading to economic growth. Substantially hit by the 2008-09 
financial crisis, developed economies like the U.S., Japan, and European 
countries have altered their monetary policies, which has deliberately or 
unintentionally caused their currencies to depreciate. Many developing 
countries also purposely undervalue their currencies by a fixed-exchange-rate 
regime or constant interventions to pursue a long-run export-led growth 
strategy.
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 International politics hence often involves the scenario where the 
developed countries ask the developing ones to appreciate their currencies. 
    Nevertheless, firms and industries respond to exchange-rate movement 
differently. For example, Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) find that by 
reducing their markups, more productive exporters can absorb negative shocks 
of currency appreciation better than their less productive counterparts. At the 
sectoral level, if appreciation of a developing country's currency moves its 
export structure towards the industries in which developed countries are 
concentrated in, the corresponding depreciation of developed countries' 
                                               
23 In the case of China, reliable estimates show that Chinese currency was undervalued by 
around 40% as of 2000 (Frankel 2006) and around 25% as of 2005 (Rodrik 2010). Rodrik 
(2008) explains this rationale by showing the clear positive associations between undervalued 
currencies, large exports, and rapid growth in developing countries.  
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currencies may thus have limited effect on restraining imports and promoting 
exports. 
    To the best of our knowledge, there is no work on how the exchange rate 
changes a country's export structure (i.e., the distribution of export values 
across different industries), despite numerous studies on the effect of the 
exchange rate on aggregate export values and individual firm behaviors (e.g., 
Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings, 2014; Berman, Martin, and Mayer, 2012; 
Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro, and Vichyanond, 2013; Dekle, Jeong, and Ryoo, 
2010; Li, Ma, and Xu, 2013). This paper fills this void by using a sudden and 
unexpected currency revaluation in China to examine whether and how the 
exchange rate affects export structure. 
On July 21, 2005, the Chinese government unexpectedly revalued its 
currency against the U.S. dollar, which resulted in an immediate appreciation 
of 2.1 percent (for a detailed description on this episode and the 
unexpectedness, see Section 2.3). The sharp change in China's exchange rate 
provides us an opportunity to have an arguably clean identification of the 
effect of currency appreciation using a regression discontinuity (RD) 
estimation. Specifically, the exogeneity of currency appreciation makes export 
structure before currency appreciation (i.e., January 2005-July 2005) a good 
counterfactual to the one after currency appreciation (i.e., August 
2005-December 2005). Meanwhile, to purge the monthly effect (e.g., 
differences in U.S. demand across months), we add data of a year during 
which Chinese currency was fixed against the U.S. dollar, as a control group, 
and conduct a difference-in-differences (DD) estimation. 
30 
 
In our empirical investigation, we use an index developed by Hausmann, 
Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) which measures how relatively heavily a good is 
exported by developed countries. In particular, we use this index to construct 
an export similarity index that measures how similar China's exports are to 
developed countries (see details in Section 2.3). Our RD-DD estimation results 
show that after the currency appreciation, China's export structure to the U.S. 
becomes more similar to that of developed countries.
24
 These results remain 
robust to a battery of sensitivity checks, including a 
difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimation, a placebo test, an 
examination of U.S. exports to China, and an exclusion of processing trade. 
    To illustrate how the exchange rate changes export structure, we present a 
trade model with monopolistic competition in which two sectors of 
differentiated goods differ mainly in their elasticities of substitution. As the 
Chinese currency is heavily controlled and undervalued, we take the fact of an 
undervalued South's currency as the key feature defining the North-South 
structure. As explained in Section 2.4, there is strong evidence that developed 
countries export relatively heavily in goods with low elasticity of substitution 
(high markups). Given that the North exports relatively heavily in goods with 
high markups, we show that if the South's currency appreciates, the South's 
export structure becomes closer to the North's. The intuition is that when the 
South's exports become more expensive due to currency appreciation, the 
reductions in the North's expenditure on these goods are larger in the sector 
with higher price elasticity. Whereas this argument based on the intensive 
                                               
24 We focus on China's exports to the U.S. as China's sudden exchange-rate change is against 
the U.S. dollar. We do not examine China's exports to the world because the weighted average 




margin with entry fixed in the short run fits our empirical results, the same 
result holds in the long run when free entry is allowed. 
One direct implication of our empirical results is that since developed 
countries (or the U.S.) concentrate on and export relatively more of those 
goods with low elasticity of substitution, the competition in these goods from 
China is reduced, but not by much. Whereas our empirical results are 
necessarily short-term by the identification strategy, changes in export 
structure may have important long-run implications, especially with the 
resource reallocation and learning-by-doing effects so that Chinese producers 
may gradually become more productive and provide fiercer competition in 
these, so to speak, high-end sectors. Another long-run implication is related to 
the result in Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) that when a country's 
export structure becomes similar to that of developed countries, the ensuing 
economic growth of the country would be higher. Similar empirical findings 
are uncovered by Jarreau and Poncet (2012) in the context of China. The 
rationale is based on a "cost discovery" story or more generally, the idea of 
"countries become what they produce". In sum, whereas consumers in the 
South obviously would benefit from the South's currency appreciation, 
appreciation may not be all that bad even from the viewpoint of production. 
    While the model displays a mechanism of resource reallocation across 
firms within a locality, our empirical estimates capture the whole spectrum of 
resource reallocation. That is, our estimates capture three margins of the 
changes in export structure: across cities, within city and across firms, and 
within firm and across products. Meanwhile, by further exploring the data, we 
can decompose the appreciation effect on export structure into these three 
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margins. We find that resource reallocation within city and across firms 
accounts for the majority of our appreciation effect (i.e., 72.22 percent), while 
resource reallocation across cities as well as within firm and across products 
explain 16.67 percent and 11.11 percent, respectively. 
    The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a theory of how 
export structure is affected by the exchange rate. Section 2.3 describes our 
data, variables, and empirical strategy, including details of the reform of 
China's exchange-rate regime in July 2005. Empirical results including 
robustness checks are reported in Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 A Model of Exchange Rate and Export Structure 
We extend a standard monopolistic competition model of trade à la 
Krugman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) to provide a    
plausible mechanism regarding how export structure is affected by the      
exchange rate. 
 
2.2.1 Model Setup 
There are two countries, North and South, with population nL  and sL , 
respectively. Here, we think of China as the South, who sets up a 
fixed-exchange-rate regime, and therefore the exchange rate between two 
countries is a policy (exogenous) variable. There are three goods/industries in 
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33 
 
where ),1,0(i  for },2,1,0{i jiQ is the consumption of good ,i in country 
,j  and  i i 1 . Labor is the only production input. Good 0 is the 
numeraire good produced with a constant returns technology and is freely 
traded within and between countries. This numeraire good is not subject to 
currency exchange. We normalize the labor productivity of good 0 to 1, and 
hence wages are also normalized to 1 in both countries. 
    Goods 1 and 2 are both differentiated and tradable, and the composite 


























where )(jiq  is the consumption of variety  , and ,ji denotes the set of 
the varieties of good ,i  consumed in country .j
 
The elasticity of 
substitution is i  
in industry .i  We assume that ,12    so that good 2 
has a lower price elasticity than good 1. Trade in the two differentiated 
industries is subject to currencies and the exchange rate, i.e., people sell and 
buy the goods with the country's currency if the trade is within the country, 
and if trade is between countries, then currency exchange is needed. Barring 
frictions, the real exchange rate of these goods across countries is 1. However, 
there are numerous factors/distortions that will create a bias of the real 
exchange rate from 1. Especially in the fixed-exchange-rate regime, the real 
exchange rate may differ significantly from 1. Say, a unit of a good in the U.S. 
can be exchanged for 1e  units of the same good in China (hence one unit 
of good in China can be exchanged for 11 e units in the U.S.). From here 
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onward, we assume that the real exchange rate from a North's to a South's 
good is 1e , which captures the fact that the South often uses the exchange 
rate as a policy tool to implement an export-oriented development strategy. 
    On top of the exchange-rate distortion, trade between countries is also 
subject to standard iceberg trade cost so that to deliver one unit to the other 
country, 1  units needs to be shipped. By paying an entry cost ,  each 
firm draws a distinct variety (and hence is a monopolist for it) and can produce 
the good with constant marginal cost .c  Firms can price discriminate across 
countries. The probability that a variety will be in industry i  is given by ,i  
and .121   Free entry determines the number of firms jM  in each 
country .j  The number of firms in industry i  in country j  is therefore 
.jiji MM   
Note a key difference between e  and   in the model.25 Here, an 
increase of the trade cost   increases import prices in both countries and the 
degree of separation between the two markets, whereas a decrease in e  
increases the South's import prices while decreasing the North's import prices. 
Hence, e  has an asymmetric effect, whereas the effect of   is symmetric. 
Having multiple sectors with different i  and the asymmetric effect of e  
considerably increases the complexity of the model, and hence for tractability 
and for our purpose of illustrating sectoral shifts, we opt to go with a 
homogeneous-firm model, instead of a heterogeneous-firm one. 
 
                                               
25 As will be more clear after Proposition 1, the role of trade cost   is indispensible, 
because without it, i.e., 1 , there won't an equilibrium, since all the firms will earn more 




2.2.2 Equilibrium and the Effect of the Exchange Rate 
Let )(jip  be the price of variety   of industry i  that faces the 
consumers in j . The Cobb-Douglas-CES structure implies that the total sales 







































  Let 
I
nip  
denote the price of an imported good in the North (from a South firm).
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  In particular, the effective (delivered) marginal cost 




  Hence, ,, cepcp i
I






































   
    Similarly, for the North, we have ,)(,)( 1 cecpccp i
I
siini 
  and ni  
is similarly derived. The price indices are rewritten as 
                                               
26 Note that 
I
nip  is the sales of one unit of a good with the North currency (but denominated 
in numeraire), and these convert to more than enough South currency to buy one unit 







































































































































































































m   is the ratio of entry between the two countries. The 
equilibrium entry ratio *m satisfies (2.1), and the level of sM  and nM  can 
be determined by 0sE (or, equivalently, 0nE ). In the following 
proposition, we show that when trade cost   is sufficiently large, there is a 
unique finite equilibrium entry ratio 0* m , which implies that equilibrium 
entries in both countries are positive. Moreover, *m strictly increases with an 
appreciation of the South's currency. 
Proposition 1 Denote ./ sn LL  Let a  be the solution of   to the 
following equation. 
   ,11111    eee    
and 
 
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Let  ,,maxˆ biaii    where ai  and bi  are the values of a  and b
when .i   Suppose the trade cost   is such that  .ˆ,ˆmaxˆ 21  
Then, there exists a unique finite equilibrium entry ratio 0* m  (positive 
entries in both countries), and *m  strictly increases in .e  
Proof. See the Appendix 2 
To understand this proposition, think of the case of 1  and .sn LL 
In this case, there is no separation between the two countries, and the two 
countries are symmetric, except that the South's firms enjoy an edge due to 
exchange-rate distortion ( 1e ). Hence, all firms in the South enjoy larger 
profits than those in the North, and 0* m  in equilibrium ( 0nM ). On the 
other hand, if ,  then the effect of 1e  becomes nil and there must 
be positive entries in both countries. Hence, a sufficiently large   is required 
to have enough separation between the two markets.
27
 Since an increase in e
implies that the South's firms' edge due to the exchange rate is reduced, and 
hence we expect less entry in the South and more in the North, leading to an 
increased .*m  
 
2.2.3 Export Structure and the Exchange Rate 

















that is, the more developed country's (North's) export 
                                               
27 The condition also involves the ratio of country size sn LL /  because it is possible 
that given an e  and  , *m  becomes infinity ( 0sM ) when   is very large so that the 
advantage of the South due to e  is reversed due to the large population in the North and the 
home market effect. Nevertheless, regardless of the value of e  and  , as long as   is 
sufficiently large, positive entries in both countries are guaranteed. 
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in industry 2 is more than that of the less developed country (the South). This 
































 so that the export structure of the two 
countries become more similar when the South's currency appreciates. Note 
that export volume from the South in industry ,i  is  IniniInisisi pqpeMX 1  . 
So, 





































s              (2.2) 
Similarly, 







































             
(2.3) 
           
 
    In the short run, nM  and sM  (and hence m ) are fixed. If price indices 







 increases with e , as .21   This is 
basically an intensive margin effect that when the South's goods become more 
expensive, the quantities demanded and sales in the North for these goods are 
reduced, but the effect is stronger for good 1 than good 2, because good 1 has 
a larger price elasticity. Proposition 2 shows that this effect at intensive 
margin is robust when taking into account the adjustment of price indices and 
















  holds, and hence the export structures in the two countries 
become more similar with a currency appreciation. 
Proposition 2 Suppose that ,12    ,1e  and  ˆ  so that there is a 
unique equilibrium with positive entries in both countries (Proposition 1). 
Then, 
1. Both in the short run when entries nM  and sM  are fixed and in the 

































 That is, the South’s export in industry 2 relative to 
that in industry 1 increases when currency in the South appreciates. 














  and the export structure in the South becomes closer to 
that in the North when the South's currency appreciates. 
(a) The two countries have the same population size, i.e., ,sn LL  and the 
real exchange rate is such that .1e  
(b) The South has a larger population, i.e., ,sn LL   and the real 
exchange rate is .1e  
Proof. See the Appendix 2. 
Given the empirical finding in the next subsection that developed 
countries export relatively more goods with low elasticity of substitution, the 
more important message of Proposition 2 is Point 1, because given this fact, 
currency appreciation leads to a more similar export structure. Point 2 shows 
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some conditions under which the above-mentioned fact can be generated from 
the model. The intuition behind Point 2(a) is that 1e  creates an advantage 
for producers in the South, and this advantage is more pronounced for industry 
1 because the price elasticity is larger. Although we do not model how the 
wages are determined, it is worthwhile noting that the price advantage of the 
South reflected by 1e  is similar to the effect when the South's wages are 
lower than the North's, which is fitting to the U.S.-China scenario. Point 2(b) 
holds mainly because the home market effect is more pronounced for the good 
with larger price elasticity. It is easy to verify numerically that the same result 
holds in the convex combination of these two conditions, i.e., the case of 




2.2.4 Developed Countries Export Relatively More Goods with 
Low Demand Elasticities 
Our theoretical analysis shows that when the South appreciates its currency, its 
exports become more skewed towards the industry with lower elasticity of 
substitution, and the export structure becomes more similar to developed 
countries. To connect our theoretical and empirical analyses, it is important to 
examine whether developed countries export relatively more goods with low 
elasticity of substitution. To this end, we examine the correlation between two 
                                               
28 It is also possible to explain the difference in export structure via technological differences. 















   i.e., the North firm is more able and hence 
more likely to produce goods in industry 2, and there may be some natural association 














but since the effect of the exchange rate is mainly a price one, the result that the South's export 
structure moving closer to the North's should remain similar, at least in the short run. 
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relevant measures: an index developed by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik 
(2007) called PRODY  that measures how heavily a good is exported by 
developed countries (see Section 2.3.1 for more details of this measurement) 
and a good's estimated elasticity of substitution by Broda and Weinstein 
(2006). Figure 2.1 shows a nonparametric relationship between the elasticity 
of substitution that we obtain from Broda and Weinstein (2006) and the export 
similarity index used in our empirical analysis. Clearly, there is a fairly strong 




2.3 Estimation Strategy 
2.3.1 Data and Variables 
Our study draws on data from two sources. The first one is the China Customs 
data from 2000 (the earliest year of the data) to 2006 (the most recent year the 
authors have access to). The data set is at firm-product-destination-month 
level, covering a universe of all monthly import and export transactions by 
Chinese exporters and importers. Specifically, it includes product information 
(HS 8-digit-level classification), trade value, identity of Chinese importers and 
exporters, and import and export destinations. 
    The second data source is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
maintained by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), from which we obtain 
the monthly bilateral nominal exchange rates between China and the U.S. for 
the 2000-2006 period. 
                                               
29 Both PRODY and elasticity of substitution are at HS 3-digit level. The PRODY at HS 
3-digit level is the trade-weighted average of PRODY at HS 6-digit level. The HS 3-digit 
elasticity of substitution is estimated based on U.S. trade data, and downloaded from 
http://www.columbia.edu/~dew35/TradeElasticities/TradeElasticities.html, see Broda, 
Greenfield, and Weinstein (2006). Moreover, the fitted curve excludes the top 5% sigma, i.e. 7 
sigmas with a value greater than 10. 
42 
 
    To characterize China's export structure to the U.S., we first construct an 
index that differentiates each export product. Specifically, we use the 














where ijX  




is country sj'  
total export value; jGDPPC  
is the real per capita GDP of country j ; and 
iN  is a normalization term used to have the coefficients summed up to 1. The 
intuition behind this measurement is that a good with a higher value of 
iPRODY  
is exported more often by developed countries. 
    In the empirical analysis, we use COMTRADE data to compute 
iPRODY  
for each HS-6 product in 2000 (the initial year of our data),
30
 and 
then use the China Customs data to obtain a measure of overall export 
structure cmY  (denoted as Export Similarity Index) for each city c  in each 
month m
 







PRODYY ,  
where icmX  is the export value of good i  to the U.S. by city c  at month 
m ; and icmX  
is the total export value to the U.S. by city c
 
at month m . 
    By fixing iPRODY  
in the initial year, we attribute the change in the 
city-level measurement cmY  to the change in the allocation of exports across 





). In other words, this 
                                               




approach allows us to capture the change in the export structure, specifically, 
the similarity of export structure between China and developed countries. 
    To get a sense of iPRODY , we list in Table 2.1 the five HS-6 product 
categories with the lowest values of iPRODY  
and the five HS-6 product 
categories with the highest values. Consistent with our intuition, goods with 
the lowest values of iPRODY  
are largely agricultural products, such as 
"Vegetable products nes", "Sisal and Agave (raw)", and "Cloves (whole fruit, 
cloves, and stems)". In the meantime, goods with the highest values of 
iPRODY  
are mostly metallic goods, such as "Cermets and articles thereof 
(waste or scrap)", "Sections H iron or non-alloy steel (nfw 
hot-roll/drawn/extruded > 80m)", "Sheet piling of iron or steel", and 
"Flat-rolled iron or non-alloy steel (coated with aluminium, width > 600mm)". 
An alternative measurement of export structure in the literature is the one 
proposed by Schott (2008), based on Finger and Kreinin (1979)'s export 
similarity index (ESI). Specifically, it calculates the similarity between China's 
export structure and those of some developed countries (such as OECD 
countries), and the higher values mean more similarity. To calculate this 
measure, we need export data from other developed countries, which are 
available to us at the yearly frequency (i.e., via UN's COMTRADE data). 
However, our identification requires a measure at the monthly level. 
Nonetheless, we find that the yearly correlation between the export similarity 
indices developed by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) and by Schott 




2.3.2 China’s Exchange-Rate Reform in July 2005 
Timeline. Since the financial crackdown in 1994, China had adopted a 
decade-old fixed-exchange-rate regime, in which her currency (Renminbi) was 
pegged to the U.S. dollar at an exchange rate of 8.28. At 19:00 on July 21, 
2005 (Beijing time), the People's Bank of China (PBOC, the central bank of 
China) suddenly announced a revaluation of Chinese currency against the U.S. 
dollar, which was set to be traded at an exchange rate of 8.11 immediately or 
about 2.1% appreciation. After that, Renminbi was allowed to trade flexibly 
with a reference basket of currencies with the target for Renminbi set by the 
PBOC every day. Figure 2.2 displays the monthly exchange rate between 
Chinese currency and the U.S. dollar during 2000-2006. It is clear that there 
was a sudden appreciation of Chinese currency against the U.S. dollar in July 
2005, followed by steady and continuous appreciation. By the end of 2006, 
Renminbi had accumulated appreciation of about 5.5% against the U.S. dollar. 
    Exogeneity. The crucial part of our identification is to use the currency 
appreciation in China in mid-July 2005 as an exogenous shock; hence, it is 
important to establish the exogeneity of China's currency appreciation upfront. 
Note that the revaluation of Chinese currency in mid-July 2005 happened 
during a period of enormous international pressures on the Chinese 
government to appreciate her undervalued currency. However, the exact 
timing of the change has been widely considered as "unexpected". There is 
much anecdotal evidence as well as academic studies supporting this 
statement. 
    First, foreign pressures on Renminbi appreciation had existed for more 
than two years, and the Chinese government regarded the exchange-rate policy 
45 
 
as a matter of China's sovereignty and rejected any political pressures on this 
issue. For example, on June 26, 2005 (about a month before the currency 
revaluation), China's Premier Wen Jiabao said at the Sixth Asia-Europe 
Finance Ministers Meeting in Tianjin that China would "independently 
determine the modality, timing, and content of reforms" and rejected foreign 
pressures for an immediate shift in the nation's currency regime.
31
 One day 
later, Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the PBOC, said that it was too soon to 
drop the decade-old fixed-exchange-rate regime and that he had no plans to 
discuss the currency issue at the weekend meeting of the global central 
bankers in Basel, Switzerland.
32
 On July 19, two days before the reform, the 
PBOC still insisted that it would continue to keep the exchange rate stable and 
at a reasonable and balanced level in the second half of the year.
33
 
    Second, as elaborated by Yuan (2012), opinions were divergent among 
Chinese policy makers regarding whether Chinese currency should be 
appreciated during that period. Specifically, the Ministry of Commerce 
opposed the currency appreciation (so as to maintain the competitiveness of 
China's export sector), while the other three central governmental agencies: 
the PBOC, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the 
Ministry of Finance, all proposed to appreciate Chinese currency. 
    Third, after the reform, both domestic and international medias responded 
to the revaluation with complete surprise. For example, CNN reported the 
                                               
31 See "Chinese Premier Warns against Yuan Reform Haste" by the Wall Street Journal 
(http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB111975074805069620) Access date: October 9, 2012. 
32 See "China's Zhou Says `Time Is Not Ripe' to Drop Yuan Peg to Dollar" by Bloomberg 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVAXsXEqKZcY&refer=ho
me) Access date: October 9, 2012. 
33 See "China to Keep RMB Exchange Rate Basically Stable: Central Bank" by People's 
Daily (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/20/eng20050720_197148.html) Access date: 
October 9, 2012. 
46 
 
episode as "The surprise move by China...".
34
 In the Financial Times' famous 
Lex Column on July 22, 2005 it was reported that "China likes to do things [in] 
its own way. After resisting pressure to revalue the Renminbi for so long, 
Beijing has moved sooner than even John Snow, the U.S. Treasury secretary, 
expected".
35
 On July 22, 2005 the BBC Worldwide Monitoring said that "The 
People's Bank of China [PBOC] unexpectedly announced last night that the 




Fourth, academic studies also imply that the change in the exchange-rate 
policy in July 2005 was unexpected. For example, Eichengreen and Tong 
(2011) study the impact of the Renminbi revaluation announcement on firm 
value in the 2005-2010 period. Using the change of stock prices before and 
after the announcement of the revaluation for 6,050 firms in 44 countries, they 
find that Renminbi appreciation significantly increases firm values for those 
exporting to China while significantly decreases firm values for those 
competing with Chinese firms in their home markets, suggesting the 
exogeneity of the policy change. 
 
2.3.3 Estimation Framework 
To identify the effect of currency appreciation on export structure, we exploit 
the sudden and unexpected currency revaluation by the Chinese government 
                                               
34 See "World Events Rattle Futures" by CNN 
(http://money.cnn.com/2005/07/21/markets/stockswatch/index.htm) Access date: October 9, 
2012. 
35 See "Renminimal THE LEX COLUMN" by Financial Times 
(http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/ap/academic/) Access date: October 9, 2012. 
36 See "Hong Kong Daily Says Exchange Rate Reform Advantageous Overall" by BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring (http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/ap/academic/) 
Access date: October 9, 2012. 
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on July 21, 2005. Specifically, the unexpectedness in the currency revaluation 
makes the export structure before the revaluation a good counterfactual to the 
one after the revaluation. In other words, the exogenous currency appreciation 
in China offers us a regression discontinuity (RD) setting, which is arguably 
closest in the observational data analysis to the experimental design (e.g., Lee 
and Lemieux, 2010). 
    Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) show that the RD estimator 
)(
 
can be identified as 







where cmcm Yy ln ; and 20050 Julym   is the cutoff month of the currency 
revaluation in China. Empirically, we focus on the data of the year 2005, use 
the local linear regression (as suggested by Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 
2001) with the triangle kernel function and the optimal bandwidth selected 
based on the procedure by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), and obtain 
standard errors through the bootstrapping method. 
However, there are two potential concerns about the above RD estimator. 
First, it may also capture the seasonal effect. For example, it could be that 
demand in the U.S. is different between July and August, causing the 
composition of Chinese exports to the U.S. to be different in these two months. 
In other words, RDˆ  becomes month  , where month  is the monthly effect 
of exports. Second, the RD estimator essentially compares China's export 
structure to the U.S. in August 2005 with that in July 2005. Hence, one may be 
concerned whether the appreciation effect can be realized within such a short 
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time window, especially given some pre-existing procurement contracts and 
the complexity of production. 
    To address these concerns, we include data of a year during which 
Chinese currency was fixed against the U.S. dollar, as a control group. 
Specifically, we choose the year 2003 as the month of Chinese New Year was 
the same for 2003 and 2005 (i.e., February), but different between 2004 and 
2005 (i.e., January in 2004). Assuming the monthly effect is the same for these 
two years, we use a DD analysis to isolate the currency appreciation effect 
from the monthly effect, i.e., 
          
,2005 cmtmtmtcmt YAugy              (2.4) 
where  2005,2003t  represents year; t  is the year fixed effect; 
 0mmIAug i   is an indicator of post-appreciation month;
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 20052005  tIY t  is an indicator of the year 2005; and m  captures the 
monthly effect. The standard errors are clustered at the month level, following 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). 
    In addition to purging the monthly effect, the DD estimator, by 
comparing the five-month average export structure in the post-appreciation 
period with the seven-month average in the pre-appreciation period, 
reasonably captures the short-term effect of currency appreciation on export 
structure. 
Note that Equation (2.4) uses an unbalanced city-level sample without 
inclusion of city fixed effects. Hence, we are estimating the overall effect of 
                                               
37 Empirically, we round 0m  to August as we only observe monthly trade data. Nonetheless, 




currency appreciation on export structure. Later, we will experiment with the 
regression with the inclusion of city fixed effects (which captures the 
within-city and across-firms effect of currency appreciation) and the 
regression using firm-level data with the inclusion of firm fixed effects (which 
captures the within-firm and across-products effect of currency appreciation). 
 
2.4 Empirical Findings 
2.4.1 Main Results 
Table 2.2 reports our estimates of the currency-appreciation effect on the 
structure of Chinese exports to the U.S. Column 1 shows the RD estimate 
using data of the year 2005. It is found that currency appreciation has a 
negligible effect on export structure: the effect is -0.2% and statistically 
insignificant. 
    However, such estimates may be biased due to some seasonal effects, e.g., 
U.S. demand difference between July and August. Column 2 presents the    
DD estimate by using data of the year 2003 as a control group. The DD 
estimate becomes positive and statistically significant, implying that currency 
appreciation makes the structure of Chinese exports to the U.S. more similar to 
those by developed countries. 
    Figure 2.3 presents graphically the results corresponding to Table 2.2: the 
dots and crosses represent the mean value of the similarity of Chinese export 
structure with developed countries' (in logarithm) for each month in 2003 and 
2005, respectively; whereas the fitted curves are calculated using local linear 
regression with triangle kernel function. Clearly, the export similarity value 
dropped significantly from July 2003 to August 2003, suggesting a strong 
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monthly effect. Differencing out such monthly effects, there was a sizable 
increase in the similarity value between July 2005 and August 2005, consistent 
with our estimates in Table 2.2. Meanwhile, export similarity values from 
January to June in 2003 and 2005 followed quite parallel trends, lending 
support to the argument that currency revaluation in July 2005 was largely 
exogenous and data in 2003 constructs a good comparison group for data in 
2005. 
Note that our estimates of the appreciation effect on export structure 
could be underestimated due to at least two reasons. Firstly, despite the fact 
that the exact timing of currency revaluation (i.e., July 2005) was completely 
unexpected, there had been some expectation that the Chinese government 
might revalue her currency since mid-2004. Such an expectation may make 
some producers change their behavior (like product upgrading decisions) 
earlier than the occurence of currency appreciation, causing an 
underestimation of our effect of interest. Secondly, our DD estimator captures 
largely a short-term effect of currency appreciation. In the long run, producers 
can upgrade their technologies, acquire advanced management practices, and 
recruit intelligent employees, all of which make our estimate underestimated. 
 
2.4.2 Robustness Checks 
In this subsection, we present a battery of robustness checks on our 
aforementioned estimation results in Table 2.3. 
    Alternative way of controlling for the monthly effect. While the 
inclusion of the year 2003 data helps us control for the monthly effect arising 
from the U.S. market situation, one may be concerned that the economic 
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environment in China changed from July 2005 to August 2005, which 
spuriously generates the positive relationship between currency appreciation 
and change in the export structure.
38
 As a check on such concerns, we look at 
the structure of Chinese exports to Nigeria, a country whose currency 
remained stable against Chinese currency in 2003 and 2005 especially 
between July and August (see Appendix Figure 2.1 for details). Column 1 of 
Table 2.3 reports a DD estimate of Equation (2.4) using Chinese export data to 
Nigeria. It is found that the estimated coefficient is highly insignificant and the 
magnitude is close to zero, indicating no significant changes in the Chinese 
market situation at the time of currency revaluation. 
    DDD estimation. In column 2 of Table 2.3, we combine Chinese export 
data to the U.S. in 2003 and 2005 with Chinese export data to Nigeria in 2003 
and 2005, and conduct a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) 
estimation, which enables us to control for the monthly effect arising from 
changes in both Chinese and foreign markets. Clearly, we find an estimate of 
0.017, similar to that in column 2 of Table 2.2 (i.e., 0.018), suggesting the 
robustness of our previous findings. 
    Placebo test – pre-revaluation period. Given that Chinese currency was 
pegged to the U.S. dollar in 2002 and 2003, there was no break in the 
exchange rate between July and August in these years. Meanwhile, tariff 
reduction in China happened in the beginning instead of in the middle of the 
year; as a result, tariff reduction shall not contaminate our estimation. Hence, a 
DD estimation using data of the year 2002 and the year 2003 shall generate 
                                               
38 Note that tariff reduction in China happened in the beginning instead of in the middle of the 
year; as a result, tariff reduction shall not contaminate our estimates. 
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zero appreciation effect. Indeed, we find, in column 3 of Table 2.3, the DD 
estimator is highly insignificant and its magnitude is close to zero. 
    U.S. exports to China. As the appreciation of Chinese currency against 
the U.S. dollar means the depreciation of the latter against the former, we shall 
expect a reversed sign using the U.S.'s export structure to China as the 
outcome variable. Column 4 of Table 2.3 reports the DD estimate using 
Chinese imports from the U.S. in 2003 and 2005. Consistently, we find a 
negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient, implying that the 
appreciation of Chinese currency against the U.S. dollar makes U.S. exports to 
China more similar to those exported by developing countries. 
Exclusion of processing trade. A unique feature of the Chinese trade 
system is that China allows some firms to import intermediate inputs free of 
tariffs but to export all their output, the so-called processing trade regime (e.g., 
Yu, 2014). One may be concerned that our results are driven by this special 
trade regime, hence compromising the external validity of our findings. To 
address such concern, we, in column 5 of Table 2.3, focus on the analysis of 
ordinary exports. Evidently, we still find a positive and statistically significant 
effect of appreciation on export similarity towards developed countries' export 
structures. Meanwhile, despite a slight drop, the estimated magnitude (0.014) 
is statistically indifferent from the estimate in our benchmark model (i.e., 
0.018 in column 2 of Table 2.2). 
 
2.4.3 Decomposition of the Effect of Currency Appreciation 
In this section, we use our data to decompose the resource reallocation at 
different margins (i.e., across cities, across firms within a city, and across 
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products within a firm). Our previous analyses use an unbalanced city/firm 
sample; hence, the DD estimate in column 2 of Table 2.2 is the overall effect 
of currency appreciation, including resource reallocation across cities, within 
city and across firms, and within firm and across products. To decompose the 
currency appreciation effect on export structure into these three different 
margins, we conduct two more regressions in Table 2.4. Specifically, in 
column 1, we include city dummies and in column 2, we use a sample of 
surviving multi-product exporters (i.e., those that existed before and after 
currency revaluation) with an inclusion of firm dummies.
39 
    Both coefficients are found to be positive and statistically significant, 
consistent with our previous findings. Meanwhile, as the analysis with the 
inclusion of city dummies essentially calculates the effect of appreciation on 
the within-city change in export structure, the comparison of the coefficient 
with the one without city dummies (i.e., the one in column 2 of Table 2.2) can 
give us the degree of across-cities resource reallocation effect of currency 
appreciation. Similarly, the comparison of coefficients between column 1 and 
column 2 can allow us to gauge the magnitude of within-city, across-firms 
resource reallocation effect of currency appreciation. Finally, the coefficient in 
column 2 produces the within-firm, across-products resource reallocation 
effect of currency appreciation. 
It is found that the majority of the currency appreciation effect on export 
structure comes from the resource reallocation within city and across firms, 
i.e., accounting for (0.015-0.002)/0.018=72.22%. Meanwhile, the across-cities 
                                               
39 Note that we put the change in export revenues for single-product firms in the category of 
the resource reallocation within city and across firms. 
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resource reallocation accounts for around (0.018-0.015)/0.018=16.67%, while 
the within-firm, across-products resource reallocation accounts for 11.11%. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether and how a country's export structure responds 
to its exchange-rate movement. Using China's sudden and unexpected 
revaluation of its currency against the U.S. dollar, we identify the effect of 
exchange rates on export structure through the combined regression 
discontinuity and difference-in-differences framework. We find that after its 
currency appreciation, China's exports to the U.S. became more similar to 
those by developed countries. Meanwhile, we find that the majority of the 
currency-appreciation effect on export structure comes from the resource 
reallocation within city and across firms. 
    The major implication of our empirical findings is that the depreciation 
strategy used by developed countries may reduce the import competition from 
developing countries, but not by much. Despite of the fact that our empirical 
results are necessarily short-term by the identification strategy, changes in 
export structure may have important long-run implications, especially with the 
resource reallocation and learning-by-doing effects. 





When Trade Discourages Political Favoritism: Evidence 
from China 
3.1 Introduction 
Since Adam Smith and David Ricardo, economists have espoused the benefits 
of free trade. A brief aberration occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
when the New Trade Theory shows that in a world with market imperfections, 
trade barriers could in fact increase national welfare (e.g., Brander and 
Spencer 1982; Krugman1982; Dixit 1984). However, as new research 
uncovers heretofore overlooked sources of gains from trade in recent years, 
there is a growing realization that the welfare gains from trade might have 
been underestimated after all (e.g., Melitz 2003; Lileeva and Trefler 2010; 
Melitz and Redding 2014).
40
 
    One previously overlooked source of trade gains is the increase in overall 
productivity when trade liberalization induces a reallocation of resources from 
less productive to more productive firms (Melitz 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano 
2008). This channel through which trade enriches a nation appears to be 
particularly relevant to developing economies, where firms differ in 
productivities more than their counterparts in the developed world and there 
exists considerable room to improve allocative efficiency (Hsieh and Klenow 
2009; Pages 2010). One factor that contributes to the greater dispersion of 
productivity in developing countries is government protection of inefficient 
firms. For instance, it is well-documented that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
                                               
40 See Melitz and Trefler (2012) for a review. 
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in China enjoy favorable access to resources such as cheap credit and land,
 41
 
even though they are less efficient than non-SOEs.
42
 If the government 
displays favoritism toward some firms over others before trade liberalization, 
the cost of providing such support may increase when trade liberalization 
induces more market competition. Any subsequent withdrawal of political 
favoritism would improve resource allocation and generate productivity gains. 
In this paper, we empirically investigate if there exist such gains from trade 
(generated through reducing political economy inefficiencies) by studying 
China's accession to the World Trade Organization. We examine if the event 
reduces the market share of the inefficient but politically favored SOEs. 
    Our analysis is based primarily upon the 1998--2005 Annual Survey of 
Industrial Firms (ASIF), the most comprehensive firm-level data in China. 
Replicating the strategy in Topalova (2007), we use China's accession to the 
WTO in December 2001 to conduct a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis 
on Chinese cities: our identification strategy exploits variations in city-level 
industrial composition, which generated differential trade shocks across cities 
after tariffs were lowered. This allows us to compare the SOE output and 
employment shares in cities that experienced larger degrees of trade 
liberalization with those that experienced smaller degrees of trade 
liberalization before and after China's WTO accession. 
    We find that trade liberalization significantly reduced both the output and 
employment shares of SOEs. In our preferred specification, trade liberalization 
                                               
41 According to Liu and Zhou (2011), large and medium-sized non-SOEs face an average 
interest rate that is 6 percentage points higher than SOEs of corresponding size, whereas the 
average interest rate of small non-SOEs is 9 percentage points more than that of small SOEs. 
42 According to the Chinese Statistical Yearbook, the ROA of industrial SOEs was 3.0% in 
2002, while the ROAs of foreign invested firms and domestic non-SOEs were 6.0% and 5.6% 
respectively. See also World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council, 
P.R.C. (2012, ch. 3). 
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induced a 2.48 percentage points decline in SOE output share between 2001 
and 2005, or 16.4% of the actual decline observed during this period.
43
 Based 
on the efficiency gain estimates calculated by (Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we 
infer that trade liberalization through the WTO accession reduced the standard 
deviation of manufacturing firm productivity in China by 1.41%. While this 
reduction may appear modest, it is an additional welfare gain on top and above 
the traditional gains of trade arising from country differences and comparative 
advantage. 
    What drove the post-WTO accession contraction of SOE output and 
employment shares? Further investigation indicates that it was mainly driven 
by an increase in import competition instead of improved access to export 
markets or cheaper imported intermediate inputs. In addition, the contraction 
took place across a variety of industries and was not confined to the industries 
initially dominated by SOEs. Finally, like Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang, 
and Zhang (2012), we find that the contraction occurred at the extensive 
margin (i.e., due to exit) instead of the intensive margin (i.e., due to surviving 
SOEs losing output share). 
Interestingly, we find that SOEs affiliated to county and township 
governments were more likely to exit after China's WTO accession, while 
SOEs affiliated with higher levels of government (central, provincial, and city) 
were largely unaffected. In other words, the SOEs that exited the market after 
December 2001 were not the least productive ones—as existing theoretical 
models such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) would have predicted—but those 
                                               
43 The city-level average output share of Chinese SOEs fell from 29.55% in 2001 to 14.42% 
in 2005. Besides trade liberalization, other factors that contributed to this decline include SOE 
reform and the relaxation of FDI regulations. See Section 3.3 for a detailed discussion. 
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with the weakest political backing. Since the fiscal health of higher level 
Chinese governments were far superior to that of the counties and townships,
44
 
this finding provides further evidence that the increased cost of supporting 
inefficient firms after China entered the WTO contributed to the observed 
decline in SOE output and employment shares. It also suggests that while 
trade liberalization induces productivity gains by making government support 
of inefficient firms more costly, such gains are made at the margin and some 
inefficiency is likely to persist as long as the government has the financial 
ability and political will to continue providing support. 
Our work is related to several strands of the literature. First, there is a 
recent revival of interest in the sources and magnitude of gains from trade. In a 
much cited paper, Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) show that 
for a variety of trade models which satisfy the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) restriction, the gains from trade can be pinned down by two 
parameters: the share of expenditure on domestic goods (λ) and the elasticity 
of imports with respect to variable trade costs (ε). An implication of this result 
is that the gains from trade may be modest. Indeed, Eaton and Kortum (2002) 
estimate that the US would suffer a welfare loss of only 0.8% if it moves to 
autarky in manufactures. More recent studies have focused on examining the 
pro-competitive effects of trade which are overlooked under the CES 
restriction (e.g., de Blas and Russ 2010; Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and 
Rodriguez-Clare 2012; Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu 2012; Holmes, Hsu, and 
Lee 2013) and our paper is an effort in this direction. 
                                               
44 Local governments in China shoulder 80% of all public expenditure responsibilities but 
receive only 40% of the tax revenues (World Bank and Development Research Center of the 
State Council, P.R.C. 2012, Figure 0.8). 
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Our paper also makes contact with studies that investigate the mitigating 
effect of trade on export distortions (Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei 2013), tax 
distortions (e.g., Konan and Maskus 2000), and labor market distortions (e.g. 
Krishna, Yavas, and Mukhopadhyay 2005 and Krishna and Yavas 2005). In 
particular, Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (2013) find that upon the expiration 
of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) in 2005, new entrants in China—most 
of them non-SOEs—drove up the volume of Chinese textile and clothing 
exports while driving down their prices. According to their structural 
estimation, an improved allocation of export quotas accounts for 71% of 
China's overall gains from the expiration of MFA. 
There is a growing literature looking at China's accession to the WTO 
and these studies overwhelmingly indicate that the benefits of WTO 
membership are positive for China. Chen, Ma, and Xu (2014) propose a 
generalized trade restrictiveness index and use it to confirm the WTO's 
effectiveness in removing tariff barriers in China, while Yu (2014) detects a 
positive impact of WTO-associated tariff reduction on the productivity of 
Chinese firms. Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) document that 
between 1998 and 2007, the productivity of incumbent firms grew at a 
weighted average of 2.9%—8.0% annually. Exploring sectoral variations in 
tariff reduction upon the WTO accession, Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang, 
and Zhang (2012) show that trade liberalization reduces firm prices and 
markups. Fan, Li, and Yeaple (2013) find that WTO accession led to an 
improvement in the quality of Chinese exports. According to Han, Liu, and 
Zhang (2012), accession to the WTO significantly increased its wage 
inequality but much of this effect was due to an increase in returns to 
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education. Using cross-sectional and panel data, Lan and Li (2013) show that 
trade weakens nationalism in China. 
Finally, our study contributes to the literature on SOEs in China. Song, 
Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) show that the presence of inefficient but 
politically favored SOEs helps create the puzzling coexistence of high returns 
on capital and a growing foreign surplus in China. Du, Lu, Tao, and Yu (2014) 
argue that SOEs are costly to the Chinese economy in at least two dimensions: 
not only do they have lower production efficiency, they also possess higher 
market power than non-SOEs. Li, Liu, and Wang (2012) find that the 
improved performance of SOEs in recent years is not driven by a genuine 
improvement in efficiency but by the consolidation of a vertical industry 
structure whereby the SOEs monopolize key upstream industries while the 
non-SOEs compete in downstream industries. Likewise, Tang, Wang, and 
Wang (2014) show that SOEs register significantly higher ratios of domestic 
value added in exports than foreign invested firms and large domestic 
non-SOEs and they attribute this finding to the vertical industry structure in 
China. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses our 
estimation strategy in detail. In Section 3.3, we present our empirical findings 
and conduct robustness checks. Section 3.4 concludes. 
 
3.2 Estimation Strategy 
3.2.1 China’s WTO Accession 
In July 1986, China notified the GATT (the predecessor of the WTO) that it 
would like to resume its status as a GATT contracting party. Between 1987 
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and 1992, as China was debating the direction of its economic reform 
domestically, the return to GATT was suspended. The momentum resumed 
after Deng Xiaoping's southern tour speech in 1992, and in July 1995, China 
officially filed its application to join the WTO. 
    The pivotal part of China's WTO accession process involved bilateral 
negotiations between China and the existing members of the WTO. The first 
country that signed a bilateral WTO accession agreement with China was New 
Zealand (in August 1997). The negotiation between China and the U.S. was 
the toughest. It took the two countries four years and twenty-five rounds of 
negotiation before an agreement was reached in November 1999. 
Subsequently, China reached agreements with 19 countries within half a year, 
including Canada in November 1999 and the European Union in May 2000. In 
September 2001, China concluded the agreement with Mexico, which marked 
the completion of negotiations with all WTO member countries. Finally, the 
WTO's Ministerial Conference approved by consensus the text of the 
agreement for China's entry into the WTO on November 10, 2001. 
    To illustrate its commitment to join the WTO, China cut tariffs 
substantially between 1992 and 1997. In 1992, China's (unweighted) average 
tariff rate was as high as 42.9%. Shortly after the GATT Uruguay round 
negotiations, China lowered tariffs from an average rate of 35% in 1994 to 17% 
in 1997. Tariff rates remained stable after 1997 until China officially joined 
the WTO on December 11, 2001. From 2002 onward, China took steps to 
fulfil her tariff reduction responsibility as a WTO member country. According 
to the accession agreement, China would fulfil its promised tariff cuts by 2004 
(with a few exceptions to be completed by 2010) and the average tariff rates 
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for agricultural and manufacturing products would be reduced to 15% and 8.9% 
respectively. 
    Figure 3.1 plots China's (unweighted) average tariffs for the period 
1996—2007. It shows that the tariff rates experienced a substantial drop in 
1996. This was followed by a relatively stable period between 1997 and 2001 
and another round of gradual cuts in 2002, before a steady state was reached in 
2005. The unweighted average tariff rate dropped from 15.3% in 2001 to 12.3% 
in 2004 while the weighted average tariff rate fell from 9.1% to 6.4%. 
Furthermore, the dispersion of tariffs was significantly reduced after 
China's WTO accession. As shown in Figure 3.1, the ratio of tariffs at the 25th 
percentile over those at the 75th percentile experienced a sharp drop in 2002 
and stabilized only after 2005. In Figure 3.2, we plot the relationship between 
tariff rates in 2001 and tariff rate changes between 2001 and 2005 across 
three-digit industries (the unit which we use to construct the city-level 
exposure to trade liberalization; see Section 3.2.3 for details).
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 We observe a 
strong, positive correlation, implying that industries with higher tariffs before 
China's WTO accession experienced more tariff reduction after that. This is 
perhaps unsurprising since China was free to set different tariffs for different 
industries before 2001 and this freedom was lost when it became a WTO 
member and had to reduce tariff rates to the WTO-determined levels which are 




                                               




The main dataset used in this study comes from the Annual Survey of 
Industrial Firms (ASIF), conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
of China for the period of 1998—2005. It is the most comprehensive 
firm-level dataset in China.
46
 The data contain all state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and non-SOEs with annual sales of five million RMB (around 
US$600,000) or more. The number of firms varies from over 140,000 in the 
late 1990s to over 243,000 in 2005, spanning all 31 provinces or 
province-level municipalities (covering 344 cities and 2,829 counties) and all 
manufacturing industries (29 two-digit, 164 three-digit and 464 four-digit 
industries).
47
 The dataset provides detailed firm-level information, including 
firm name, industry affiliation, location, and all operation and performance 
items reported in accounting statements such as age, employment, capital, 
intermediate inputs, and ownership. 
    Our outcome variable concerns the comparative performance of SOEs 
and non-SOEs, which requires us to first identify SOEs in our sample. In the 
benchmark analysis, we follow the official definition of SOEs in the data. 
                                               
46 This dataset is noted for its representativeness because the firms sampled contribute the 
bulk of China's industrial value-added output. The dataset is used to calculate key national 
income accounting metrics (e.g., GDP) and other statistics published in China's official 
statistical yearbooks. This dataset is found to be reasonably accurate and reliable due to strict 
double-checking procedures in the data collection process (Cai and Liu 2009). Thus, it has 
been widely used by economic researchers in recent years (Bai, Lu, and Tao 2009; Cai and 
Liu 2009; Lu, Lu, and Tao 2010; Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang 2012). 
47  During the period sampled, there were some adjustments in China's administrative 
boundaries. In some cases, new counties were established. In others, existing counties were 
merged to form larger counties or cities. To maintain consistency in our coding of cities and 
counties, we use the 1999 National Standard (promulgated at the end of 1998 and known as 
the GB/T 2260-1999) as the benchmark codes and convert the regional codes of all firms to 
these benchmark codes. Separately, in 2003 a new classification system for industry codes 
(GB/T 4754-2002) replaced the old classification system (GB/T 4754-1994) in use from 1995 
to 2002. To maintain consistency in our coding of industries for the entire period sampled 




Specifically, according to the NBS categorization, SOEs correspond to three 
specific registered ownership types in our data: (a) code 110, state-owned 
enterprises; (b) code 141, state-associated enterprises; and (c) code 151, 
enterprise solely funded by the state. As a robustness check (Appendix Table 
3.1, column 1), we use an alternative definition of SOEs proposed by Hsieh 
and Song (2013), who classify a firm as a SOE if it satisfies one of the two 
following conditions: (a) the registered capital held directly by the state 
exceeds 50%; or (b) the ASIF data identifies the state as the controlling 
shareholder of the firm. 
The dataset of Chinese tariffs is downloaded from the WTO website. 
Specifically, we use the Tariff Download Facility to obtain the standardized 
tariff statistics. For each product defined at the HS-6 digit level, the tariff data 
provide detailed information including the number of tariff lines, the average, 
minimum, and maximum ad valorem tariff duties. The tariff data is available 
for 1996, 1997 and 2001 (latest). As the WTO website does not provide tariff 
information for 1998—2000, we use the World Integrated Trade Solution 
website maintained by the World Bank to fill the void. Meanwhile, as different 
HS codes are used before and after 2002, we match the 1996 HS codes (used 
in the 1997—2001 tariff schedules) to the 2002 HS codes (used in the 
2001—2006 tariff schedules) using the standard HS concordance table. 
Furthermore, as the ASIF data is classified at the industry-level, we need to 
aggregate tariffs from the HS-product level to the industry-level. To this end, 
we first match the HS classification to the Chinese Industrial Classification 





 Subsequently, we calculate the simple average tariff for each 
industry and each year. 
Finally, in some parts of our analysis, we include several city-level 
characteristics based on the Chinese City Statistical Yearbook (multiple years). 
These variables include GDP, population, government consumption, vegetable 
consumption, dairy consumption, number of telephones, and number of 
colleges. 
 
3.2.3 Estimation Specification 
To examine the differential impacts of trade liberalization on SOEs and 
non-SOEs, we follow the locality-event difference-in-differences (DD) 
approach devised by Topalova (2007).
49
 Specifically, because the geographic 
location of industrial activities varied across Chinese cities before China's 
WTO accession, the sudden tariff reduction upon accession generates 
differential impacts on the cities. This allows us to identify the effect of trade 
liberalization on SOEs. 
    We conduct the analysis at the city-level instead of the industry-level for 
two reasons. First, generally speaking, SOEs in China are affiliated with 
territorial administrative units (i.e. center, province, city, county, or township) 
instead of functional units (i.e. by ministry or industry). Second, a city-level 
analysis allows us to capture the general equilibrium effect of trade 
liberalization on SOEs’ activities, for example, trade liberalization may affect 
                                               
48 We thank Yifan Zhang for sharing this concordance table. 
49  For studies applying this identification strategy, see Hasan, Mitra, and Ural (2007); 
Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010); McLaren and Hakobyan (2010); Topalova (2010); 
McCaig (2011); Hasan, Mitra, Ranjan, and Ahsan (2012); Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013). 
See Kovak (2013) for a micro-foundation of this identification strategy. 
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prices of local tradable and non-tradable goods as well as local wages and 
employment rates. In the latter part of the paper, we will look at whether the 
effect of trade liberalization comes from within-industry reallocation (i.e., a 
decline of SOEs’ activities within an industry) or cross-industry reallocation 
(i.e., a contraction of SOE-dominated industries relative to industries with 
smaller SOE presence). 
The specification of our DD estimation is 
  ,02 '2001
'
ctpttcctctcct PostZXTariffy         (3.1) 
where c  and t  represent city and year, respectively, and ct  is the error 
term. To deal with potential heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation, we 
cluster the standard errors at the city level (as recommended in Bertrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).
50
 
    c is the city fixed effect, controlling for all time-invariant differences 
across cities; pt  is the province-year fixed effect, controlling for all annual 
shocks common to cities (such as business cycles, macro policies, etc.) and all 
provincial heterogeneity (including all time-invariant and time-varying 
characteristics); and ctX  is a vector of time-varying city characteristics 
(including GDP per capita and the share of government consumption) that are 
potentially correlated with both our outcome variable and the regressor of 
interest and are thus included to isolate the trade liberalization effect. 
    Our outcome variable, cty , measures the share of SOEs in city c  at year 
t . In the benchmark analysis, we focus on the output share of SOEs over all 
                                               
50 We also use another approach devised by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), where 
we collapse the panel structure into two periods (i.e., one before and the other after China's 
WTO accession), and use the White-robust standard errors. We obtain similar results (see 
Appendix Table 3.1, column 2). 
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firms instead of the employment share due to labor hoarding issues in SOEs. 
Nonetheless, using employment share as the outcome variable generates 
similar results (see Appendix Table 3.1, column 3). There are three potential 
concerns with the SOE share measurement, and it is worthwhile to discuss 
them upfront. First, the ASIF data is truncated as small non-SOEs (i.e., those 
with annual sales below 5 million RMB) are not sampled. Hence, if trade 
liberalization results in both small SOEs and non-SOEs exiting the market, we 
would mistakenly detect a stronger trade effect on SOEs than on non-SOEs 
due to the truncated nature of the data. To address this measurement concern, 
as a robustness check we exclude SOEs with annual sales below 5 million 
RMB in our outcome variable (see Appendix Table 3.1, column 4). Second, 
when calculating the output share of SOEs, we average over all firms 
including SOEs, domestic non-SOEs, and foreign-invested firms. It is possible 
that an observed fall in the output share of SOEs could be driven by a surge in 
the sales of foreign firms that is not at the expense of the SOEs. To address 
this potential concern, we conduct a robustness check that excludes the sales 
from foreign firms when calculating the output share of SOEs (see Appendix 
Table 3.1, column 5). Third, when calculating the output share, we include 
output sold in the domestic market as well as output sold overseas. To the 
extent that tariff reduction affects mostly domestic competition, one may be 
concerned that the inclusion of foreign sales may potentially bias our results. 
As a robustness check, we exclude foreign sales in our outcome variable (see 
Appendix Table 3.1, column 6). 
    The regressor of interest, ctTariff , captures the city-level exposure to 
trade liberalization. Specifically, it is measured as 
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Tariff              (3.2) 
where i  represents the manufacturing industry; 2001icOutput  is the total 
output of industry i  in city c  in 2001; 2001iTariff  is the import tariff rate of 
industry i  in 2001; and tPost02  indicates the period when China becomes a 
WTO member, taking the value of 1 for year 2002 or after, and 0 otherwise. 
As a robustness check, we replace 2001iTariff  with the average tariff rate of 
industry i  in 1997—2001 (i.e., 20011997cTariff ) and find similar results (see 
Appendix Table 3.1, column 7). 
    There are two issues about our tariff measurement worth pointing out 
upfront. First, we use the interaction of tariffs in 2001 ( 2001iTariff ) and the 
post-WTO accession indicator ( tPost02 ) instead of yearly tariffs ( itTariff ), as 
used in Topalova (2007), for three reasons: (a) since China released its 
schedule of tariff reduction upon WTO accession in 2002 and firms could 
exploit this information, itTariff  is less exogenous than ti PostTariff 022001 ; 
(b) since industries with higher tariffs in 2001 experienced more tariff 
reduction upon WTO accession (as illustrated in Figure 3.2), 
ti PostTariff 022001  allows us to capture the effects of differential tariff 
reductions; and (c) as elaborated in Liu and Trefler (2011), using the 
interaction between ti PostTariff 022001  allows us to capture not only the 
realized effects of trade liberalization across the period of study, but also the 
effects of unrealized (but anticipated) tariff cuts scheduled to be phased out 
after 2005. This helps to ensure that we are not overestimating the effects of 
trade liberalization. Second, following Topalova (2007), we ignore the 
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nontraded sectors when calculating city-level tariffs. Kovak (2013) gives a 
justification of using such nonscaled tariff measurement; it avoids the 
estimation bias coming from the assumption that nontraded prices are 
unaffected by trade liberalization. 
    2001cZ  represents determinants of the geographic distribution of 
industrial activities across Chinese cities in 2001. It is interacted with the 
post-WTO accession indicator ( tPost02 ) to control for the differential effects 
of these potential preexisting differences between treatment and control 
groups on the SOE share (for a similar practice, see Gentzkow 2006). Ellison 
and Glaeser (1999) have characterized a list of determinants of geographic 
concentration, and we follow their approach closely by locating all 
determinants that they identified and are available in the Chinese City 
Statistical Yearbook. Specifically, we use the number of dairy consumption 
per capita, the number of vegetable consumption per capita, the number of 
telephones, and the number of universities in 2001, and measured in the 
logarithm form (except for the number of universities, as many cities have no 
universities). Furthermore, we categorize cities into northern cities (vs. 
southern cities), coastal cities (vs. inland cities), and mountain cities (vs. plain 
cities) to control for any differential geographic impacts. In addition, we also 
include city-specific linear time trend (i.e., tc  ) as a regressor to control for 
the underlying differences between our treatment and control groups in a 
restricted way, that is, under the assumption that these preexisting city-level 
differences affect our outcome variable linearly with time. 
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    We estimate Equation (3.1) using first differences, which removes the 




ctpttcctctct PostZXTariffy         (3.3) 
where Δ is the first-differenced operator, e.g., 1 ctctct yyy . 
In addition, to provide further support on the validity of our DD 
specification, we conduct several robustness checks: the addition of controls 
for the geographic distribution of industrial activities; a flexible estimation to 
examine whether the treatment and control groups were comparable until the 
time of WTO accession; the addition of controls for other ongoing policy 
reforms in the early 2000s (i.e., the SOE reform and the relaxation of FDI 
regulations); a placebo test using only the pre-WTO accession period data as 
in Topalova (2010); and a placebo test using the sample of pure exporters 
(those that exported 100% of their output and were therefore unaffected by 
tariff reduction). For details, see Section 3.3.2. 
 
3.3 Empirical Findings 
The regression results of the DD specification (3.3) are reported in column 1 
of Table 3.1. We find that the coefficient estimate of our regressor of interest 
(T ctTariff ) is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that cities with 
higher effective tariffs in 2001 experienced a larger decline of SOE output 
share after 2002 than those with lower effective tariffs. Given that cities with 
higher tariffs in 2001 experienced more tariff reduction after 2002, these 
results imply that trade liberalization reduces SOEs' activities. 
71 
 
One potential concern of our DD estimation is that the geographic 
distribution of industrial activities across Chinese cities in 2001 may not be 
random. If this is true, cities with different industrial structures (and hence 
facing different effective tariffs) might be systematically different before 
WTO accession, and such preexisting differences may generate the spurious 
negative relationship between trade liberalization and SOE output share in the 
post-WTO accession period. To address this concern, in column 2 of Table 3.1, 
we include an interaction term comprising the post-WTO accession period 
indicator and the determinants of geographic concentration identified by 
Ellison and Glaeser (1999) where data are available. The coefficient estimate 
of our regressor of interest remains negative and statistically significant. In 
fact, the magnitude and statistical significance both increase, suggesting that 
any bias caused by these preexisting differences has led to an underestimation 
of the effect of trade liberalization. 
 
3.3.1 Magnitude and Gains Calculation 
To gauge the economic magnitude of our estimates, we conduct the following 
exercise: The mean values of city-level tariffs in 2001 and 2005 are 17.83% 
and 9.66% respectively. Hence, the predicted change in SOE output share 
from 2001 to 2005 is -(17.83%-9.66%)∗0.304=-2.48 %, where 0.304 is the 
coefficient estimate of interest (Table 3.1 column 2). Meanwhile, during the 
2001—2005 period, the actual mean value of SOE output share fell from 
29.55% to 14.42%. Hence, trade liberalization can account for 
2.48%/(29.55%-14.42%)=16.42% of the total change in SOE output share. 
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Next, we employ the methodology developed by Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009) using the dispersion of revenue-based TFP as a proxy to capture market 
distortion. Applying the method to the ASIF data (the same data as ours), they 
find that the standard deviation of revenue-based TFP in China in 2001 is 0.68. 
We replicate their estimation specification at the city level (instead of the 
industry level) and find that every 1% decrease in the SOE output share is 
associated with a 0.57% decrease in the standard deviation of revenue-based 
TFP. 
Since the reduction of tariffs from 2001 to 2005 led to a reduction of the 
SOE output share by 2.48%, we can infer that the standard deviation of 
revenue-based TFP is reduced by 2.48%∗0.57=1.41%. In other words, the 
WTO-induced trade liberalization contributes to a 1.41% reduction in 
allocative inefficiency. 
 
3.3.2 Robustness Checks 
In this subsection, we report results of a battery of robustness checks on our 
aforementioned DD estimation. 
Flexible estimation of treatment effect parameters. To check the 
comparability between our treatment and control groups, we conduct a flexible 
estimation specification; that is, we replace the post-WTO accession period 
indicator ( tPost02 ) in the construction of city-level tariff variable with year 














 Figure 3.3 plots the estimated 
coefficients as well as the 95% confidence intervals from this exercise. It 
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shows that in the pre-WTO accession period (1998—2001), our treatment and 
control groups have comparable time trends, as the coefficients stay relatively 
constant over time. This alleviates any concern that our treatment and control 
groups are ex ante incomparable and lends support to our DD identifying 
assumption. Meanwhile, there is a visible divergence between the two groups 
in their SOE output share trends after 2002, when China took steps to reduce 
its tariffs to honor its obligations to the WTO. The consistency in timing 
suggests that trade liberalization reduces the output share of SOEs. 
City-specific linear time trend. Although we have controlled for the 
post-WTO accession time trend of SOE output share generated by the 
pre-WTO accession determinants of geographic concentration, one may still 
be concerned over some unobserved city characteristics omitted from the 
equation, which could compromise the comparability between our treatment 
and control groups. To check whether our estimates are biased due to these 
unobserved city factors, we include the city-specific linear time trend, i.e., 
tc   (in the first-differenced equation, tc   collapses to c , i.e., the city 
fixed effects). This additional control would allow us to control for all 
unobserved city characteristics if these characteristics affect our outcome 
variable in the specification of a linear time trend. Regression results are 
reported in column 1 of Table 3.2. Our regressor of interest remains negative 
and statistically significant, implying that our estimates are not driven by 
unobserved underlying city characteristics. 
    Control for other policy reforms.  China adopted several reforms that 
overlapped with its WTO accession. First, in the early 2000s, it lifted some 
restrictions on FDI by increasing the number of industries that FDI is 
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permitted and relaxing the constraints on local ownership requirements. To 
control for this reform, we add the number of foreign-invested firms (in 
logarithm) as a regressor in column 2 of Table 3.2. Our trade liberalization 
effect remains robust. 
    Second, China initiated a round of SOE reform in the late 1990s, which 
was still ongoing in the early 2000s. To control for this, we conduct three 
exercises. First, we include the percentage of SOEs that were being privatized 
as an additional control in column 3 of Table 3.2 and find that our findings 
remain robust. Second, we focus on a subsample of firms that did not 
experience a change in ownership status (i.e., they were either SOEs or 
non-SOEs throughout the period we study). We obtain similar results 
(reported in column 4 of Table 3.2). Finally, we use the degree of privatization 
as the outcome variable in column 5 of Table 3.2 and find that it is barely 
affected by trade liberalization. 
    Placebo test I: Pre-WTO accession period. As the first placebo test, we 
follow Topalova (2010) in looking at the effect of tariff changes on the SOE 
output share in the pre-WTO accession period (i.e., 1998—2001). Since the 
tariff schedule did not change significantly during this period, we expect a 
muted effect; otherwise, it may indicate the existence of some underlying 
confounding factors. As shown in column 6 of Table 3.2, we indeed find that 
tariff changes have no significant effect on the SOE output share in the 
pre-WTO accession period. 
Placebo test II: Subsample of pure exporters. In our data, there are 
firms exporting 100% of their outputs. Since these pure exporters are not 
affected by domestic competition, tariff reduction upon WTO accession shall 
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have a limited effect on them. We report the regression results in column 7 of 




In the previous section, we establish that trade liberalization (induced by 
accession to the WTO) substantially reduced the output and employment 
shares of SOEs in China. To shed light on the underlying mechanisms, we first 
examine whether the effect of trade liberalization comes from the import 
competition channel, the exporting market access channel, or the imported 
intermediate inputs channel. Next, we investigate whether the decline in SOE 
activities is due to within-industry reallocation (i.e., decline of SOE output 
share within each industry) or cross-industry reallocation (i.e., the shrinkage of 
SOE-dominated industries). We then decompose the trade effect into the 
extensive (i.e., entry and exit) and intensive (i.e., output changes of surviving 
firms) margins. Finally, we investigate whether and how different SOEs 
respond to trade liberalization differently. 
 
3.4.1 Import Competition, Export Market Access, Imported Inputs 
The WTO pursues a multilateral and multidimensional agenda. As such, 
China's accession to the WTO involved not only China reducing its tariffs on 
manufactured imports, but also existing WTO member countries lowering 
their tariffs on Chinese exports. Furthermore, Chinese firms may also gain 
access to cheaper international inputs (see, e.g., Goldberg, Khandelwal, 
Pavcnik, and Topalova 2010). If China's export tariffs and input tariffs are 
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perfectly correlated with its import tariffs (our regressor of interest), our 
aforementioned results should be interpreted as a general WTO effect instead 
of an import competition effect. 
    To differentiate these three channels (namely, increased import 
competition, better access to export markets, and cheaper imported 
intermediate inputs), we add as regressors China's export tariffs and input 




























TariffTariff 2001fiTariff  is foreign 
country f 's tariffs on Chinese imports of industry i  in 2001; 2001fiportex  is 
Chinese total exports of industry i  to foreign country f  in 2001; and 
2001iportex  is Chinese total exports of industry i  in 2001. Meanwhile, we 















TariffInput           (3.5) 
where   k kik
input
i TariffTariff 20012001 and ki  is the share of inputs from 
industry k  used by industry i , based on the 1997 Chinese input-output 
table. 
    The regression results are reported in columns 1–3 of Table 3.3. We find 
that neither export tariffs nor input tariffs are statistically significant. 
Furthermore, their magnitudes are very small, indicating that these two 
channels do not play important roles in our setting. Meanwhile, our main 
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findings on the import tariffs remain robust to the addition of these controls, 
lending support to the argument of import competition. 
As an additional check, we also investigate whether cities that 
experienced greater reductions in import tariffs also witnessed a larger 
increase in imports. Because many cities in our dataset report zero import 
values, to deal with potential estimation bias or sample selection bias we use 
the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimation devised by Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006). Specifically, we regress the level of imports on our regressor 
of interest (i.e., ctTariff ) along with a set of city and year dummies and other 
time-varying controls using the Poisson estimation. The regression results are 
reported in column 4 of Table 3.3. We find that imports increased in cities 
experiencing more tariff reduction, which supports the import competition 
argument 
 
3.4.2 Intra-vs. Inter-Industry Reallocation 
The intensification of import competition may lead to a decline of SOE share 
within each industry (intra-industry reallocation) or a shrinkage of industries 
that are dominated by SOEs (inter-industry reallocation). Both effects would 
cause a decline of SOE share at the city level. In other words, our outcome 
variable, the change in output share of SOEs in city c  at time t  ( cty ), can be 
decomposed as 
           
 
    
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s  captures the SOE 









represents the share of industry i  in city c  at time t . 









1int  captures the resource reallocation 












captures the resource reallocation from one industry to another. To disentangle 
the intra- and inter-industry effects of trade liberalization, we conduct two 
more regressions using racty
int and ercty
int  as the respective outcome 
variables. 
The regression results are reported in Table 3.4. We find that trade 
liberalization upon the WTO accession has both negative and statistically 
significant effects on intra-industry (in column 1) and inter-industry (in 
column 2) resource reallocation, but the former has a much bigger magnitude 
than the latter. These results imply that the decline in the SOE output share 
detected previously is mainly driven by the decline of SOE output share within 
each industry, whereas across industries there is some evidence that the output 
of industries with a strong SOE presence prior to China's WTO accession 
decreased after that. 
 
3.4.3 Extensive-vs. Intensive Margins 
We use the growth accounting method to examine the extensive and intensive 
margin effects of trade liberalization on the output share of SOEs. Specifically, 
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we make two changes to the output share measurement in the baseline 
Equation (3.3): first, we use the ratio of total SOE output over the total 










log ); and second, we look at the change over two time points, 
2001 (one year before the WTO accession) and 2005 (four years after the 

































           (3.7) 
Meanwhile, for each group (i.e., SOEs and non-SOEs), the five-year change in 
total output can be further decomposed into two parts: change in output of 
surviving firms and change in output due to entry and exit, i.e., 
 
 ,,2001,,2005,,,2005:2001,2005:2001 exitjcentryjcsurvivingj tctj tct QQQQ                  (3.8) 
where  .,nonSOESOEj  







































































   (3.9) 
    Table 3.5 shows that from 2001 to 2005, the total output of SOEs 
increased 2.51% from 1,514 billion RMB to 1,552 billion RMB, whereas the 
total output of non-SOEs increased 148.65% from 6,676 billion RMB to 
16,600 billion RMB. This shows that the relative importance of SOEs declined 
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in the post-WTO accession period and is consistent with our empirical 
findings. 
    More interestingly, the total output of surviving SOEs actually increased 
by 230 billion RMB from 2001 to 2005, contributing to 605.3% of the output 
gain of all SOEs that existed in 2001. However, because there were more exits 
than entries of SOEs in these five years, the extensive margin effect led to a 
gross output loss of 191 billion RMB, which implies that the net SOE output 
gain is only less than 40 billion RMB. Correspondingly, for non-SOEs, the 
intensive and extensive margins contribute 42.1% and 57.9% to their net 
output gain respectively. These numbers suggest that the decline in SOE 
output share is driven by entry and exit (or the extensive margin effect) instead 
of a substantial contraction of output among surviving firms (or the intensive 
margin effect). 
    To further investigate the effect of trade liberalization on the external and 
internal margins of SOE output share, we run two regressions similar to the 


















where  2005,2001t . Next, the specification for the extensive margin effect 







































    The regression results are reported in Table 3.6. Column 1 shows that the 
intensive margin effect of trade liberalization on the SOE output share is 
highly insignificant, while the extensive margin effect (column 2) is 
significant and economically meaningful. 
In summary, we find that the decline in the SOE output share after 
China's WTO accession is primarily caused by the exit of SOEs instead of a 
reduction in the output of surviving SOEs. These results are in line with 
Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang, and Zhang (2012), who also look at the 
episode of China's WTO accession and find that much of the sectoral 
productivity gains take place at the extensive margin. 
 
3.4.4 Heterogeneous Response of SOEs 
Building on the finding that much of the trade liberalization effect happens at 
the extensive margin, we further investigate if there are any common 
characteristics among the SOEs that exited the market. 
Productivity difference. We start with the differential exit rates of SOEs 
at different productivity levels. According to the firm heterogeneity literature 
(e.g., Melitz 2003), trade liberalization drives out the least productive firms as 
import competition raises the survival threshold. To test this hypothesis, we 
first divide SOEs into four quantiles (i.e., top 25%, 25%-50%, 50%-75%, and 
bottom 25%) based on their productivity levels in 2001, which are estimated 
using the method devised in Olley and Pakes (1996). Next, we calculate the 














  where q  denotes the productivity quantile in 2001. 
The regression specification is 
 
  ,02 '2001
'
, ctpttcctctqcq PostZXTariffExit       (3.12) 
where q  is the coefficients for different quantiles. To further capture the 
city-specific differential time trend between 2001 and 2005, we include two 
additional controls: the entry rate for SOEs and the exit rate for non-SOEs. 
    The regression results are shown in column 1 of Table 3.7. We find that 
all four estimated coefficients are positive, suggesting that trade liberalization 
increases the exit rate. However, only one of the estimates is statistically 
significant. In terms of magnitude, we find that the coefficient estimate for the 
top 25% category is smaller than the one for the 25%-50% category, which is 
in turn smaller than the coefficient for the 50%-75% category. These are 
consistent with the firm heterogeneity literature's argument that less 
productive firms are more likely to exit the market after trade liberalization. 
    Surprisingly, however, the estimated coefficient for the bottom 25% 
category is found to be the smallest, suggesting that the weakest SOEs have 
the highest probability to survive increased import competition upon the WTO 
accession. One plausible explanation is that the weakest SOEs (in terms of 
productivity) continued to enjoy government protection in the post-WTO 
accession period and thus were largely shielded from the increasingly fierce 
import competition. To explore this possibility, we further investigate the 




    Affiliation difference. In China, different SOEs are administered by 
different layers of the government: the central government, provinces, cities, 
counties, and townships. One expects that SOEs administered by higher-level 
governments would enjoy more protection than those administered by 
lower-level governments for at least two reasons: (a) higher-level governments 
have more decision power given the top-down nature of Chinese politics; (b) 
lower-level governments in China have been encountering structural fiscal 
problems since the 1994 fiscal reform (World Bank and Development 
Research Center of the State Council, P.R.C. 2012). As such, we use the 
affiliation of an SOE as a proxy for the degree of government protection it 
received and investigate whether SOEs administrated by different levels of the 
Chinese government responded to WTO accession differently. Based on the 
information of SOE affiliation in 2001, we classified the SOEs into three 
categories: SOEs under the administration of above-city-level governments 
(i.e., central and provincial governments), SOEs under the administration of 
the city government, and SOEs under the administration of below-city-level 
governments (i.e., county and township governments). We then calculate the 












  where a denotes the SOE affiliation 
category. The regression specification is 





, 02 ctpttcctctaca PostZXTariffExit     (3.13) 
where a  is the coefficient for category a . To further capture the 
city-specific differential time trend between 2001 and 2005, we include two 
additional controls, the entry rate for SOEs and the exit rate for non-SOEs. 
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    Regression results are reported in column 2 of Table 3.7. We find that the 
estimated coefficient on SOEs affiliated with below-city-level administration 
is positive and statistically significant, implying that trade liberalization 
induced the exit of SOEs in this category. Meanwhile, the estimated 
coefficients on SOEs in the other two categories are negative and insignificant, 
indicating that these SOEs were barely affected by trade liberalization. 
How do we reconcile the results in columns 1–2 of Table 3.7? Table 3.8 
provides the breakdown of SOE productivity quantile (as defined in column 1) 
by affiliation (as defined in column 2). Interestingly, we find that the weakest 
SOEs (in terms of productivity in 2001) were most likely to be administered 
by the central, provincial, or city governments. 
In sum, these results suggest that the aberration in the differential exit 
rates across productivity quantiles is driven by differential levels of 
government protection. They also indicate that although trade liberalization 
led to the reallocation of resources from inefficient SOEs to efficient 
non-SOEs, it does not completely eliminate the existing distortions and some 




In this paper, we study how China's accession to the WTO impacts the market 
share of inefficient but politically favored SOEs. We find that tariff reductions 
following China's WTO accession led to a decline in the SOE output share. 
This result is robust to a variety of robustness checks. In our preferred 
specification, China's WTO accession led to a 2.5 percentage-point decline in 
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the SOE output share, which corresponds to a 1.4% reduction in the standard 
deviation of manufacturing firm productivity in China. Given the general lack 
of competitiveness of Chinese SOEs, we interpret the reduction in their output 
share and the subsequent narrowing of productivity dispersion among the 
remaining firms as an improvement of allocative efficiency. 
We further verify that the post-WTO accession contraction of SOE output 
share was driven by increased import competition instead of improved access 
to overseas markets or cheaper imported intermediate goods. The SOE output 
share decline was broad-based and not limited to selected industries where the 
SOEs were dominant. 
Importantly, we find that the SOE output share decline took place at the 
extensive margin, and it was the exit of SOEs affiliated with the lowest levels 
of government (counties and townships) that drove the decline. By contrast, 
SOEs affiliated with the central, provincial, and city governments were barely 
affected even though many of the least productive manufacturing firms in 
China belonged to this group. This shows that while trade discourages political 
favoritism and improves resource allocation, the welfare gains are made only 
at the margin, and some inefficiency is likely to persist as long as the 
government has the financial ability to pay for its support of inefficient 
enterprises. In other words, trade mitigates but does not solve the problem. 
Another way of interpreting this finding is to think of trade as a catalyst that 
lessens existing political distortion of resource allocation. The effect of this 




    Our findings contribute to the literature by identifying another channel 
(the improvement in resource allocation in the presence of political economy 
distortions) through which trade benefits a nation. With regard to China, now 
the world's biggest trading nation, we find that different layers of the Chinese 
government responded differently to WTO accession: some increased their 
support to the SOEs under their watch, while others withdrew theirs. Given the 
central and complex role that the state plays in China's economic development, 
our findings suggest that it is useful and perhaps even important to treat the 
Chinese state as an agglomeration of component parts instead of a unitary 
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Figure 1.3: Difference between Exports to U.S. and Exports to Other Non-U.S. 
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Table 1.1: List of Countries 
Australia Finland Malta Russian Federation 
Austria France Mauritius Singapore 
Belgium Germany Mexico Slovak Republic 
Brazil Greece Morocco Slovenia 
Bulgaria Hungary Myanmar South Africa 
Cameroon Iceland Nepal Spain 
Canada Indonesia Netherlands Sri Lanka 
Chile Ireland New Zealand Sweden 
Colombia Israel Norway Switzerland 
Costa Rica Italy Papua New Guinea Thailand 
Croatia Japan Paraguay Turkey 
Czech Republic Korea, Republic of Poland United Kingdom 
Denmark Luxembourg Portugal United States 




 Table 1.2: Main Results 
      (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Ln(Export Value) 
Treatment*Post -0.176*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.165*** 
 
(0.052) (0.054) (0.054) (0.059) 
 
    
Time Fixed Effect X X X X 
Country Fixed Effect X X X 
 Ln (Import Value) 
 




Country-Specific Month-of-Year Effect 
   
X 
Number of Observations 4704 4704 4704 4704 
R-squared 0.0883 0.2825 0.2829 0.3515 
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in the parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 1.3: Robustness Checks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Ln (Export Value) 
Specification Incl. Country Time Trend Incl. Pre-Reform Trend 2004-2006 Homogeneous Triple Difference 
Treatment*Post -0.068**  -0.087** 0.037  
 


















  Treatment*Before 07/2004  0.095***    
  (0.035)    
Treatment*Post*Differentiated     -0.250*** 
     (0.077) 
Time Fixed Effect X X X X  
Country Fixed Effect X X X X  
Ln (Import Value) X X X X X 
Producer Heterogeneity X X X X X 
Country-Specific Month-of-Year Effect X X X X  
Country-Time Fixed Effect     X 
Country-Product Fixed Effect     X 
Product-Time Fixed Effect    X  
Number of Observations 4704 4704 2016 3609 7218 
R-squared 0.2725 0.3515 0.2486 0.2124 0.0171 
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in the parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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  Table 1.4: Exchange Rate Elasticity 
      (1)     (2)        (3)       (4) 









Dependent Variable Ln (Export Value) 
Ln (Exchange Rate) -0.454** -0.685** -1.605*** -1.125*** 
 
(0.190) (0.332) (0.546) (0.359) 
     
F test of Excluded Instruments 
 
 [27.02] [59.21] 
     
Time Fixed Effect X X X X 
Ln (Import Value) X X X X 
Producer Heterogeneity X X X X 
Country-Specific Month-of-Year Effect X X X X 
Number of Observations 4704 4367 4704 4367 
R-squared 0.3460 0.3508 0.3522 0.328 






Table 1.5: Trade Diversion 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Ln (Export Value) 
Specification Exclude OECD 
OCED versus the Rest 
(excl. U.S.) 
Treatment*Post -0.186** -0.029 
 
(0.091) (0.116) 
   Time Fixed Effect X X 
Ln (Import Value) X X 
Producer Heterogeneity X X 
Country-Specific Month-of-Year Effect X X 
Number of Observations 2268 4620 
R-squared 0.3787 0.3544 
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in the parenthesis. 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 1.6: The Effect of Exchange Rate Reform on Extensive and Intensive Margins 






Ln(Number of Firms) Ln(Number of HS8)  Ln(Price) Ln(Quantity) Ln(Revenue) 
Dependent Variable 
 




(0.005) (0.020) (0.018) 
       Time Fixed Effect X X 
 
X X X 
Product Fixed Effect X X 
 
X X X 
Ln(Import Value) X X 
 
X X X 
Producer Heterogeneity X X 
 
X X X 
Country-Specific Month-of-Year Effect X X 
 
X X X 
Number of Observations 4704 4704   3522562 3522562 3522562 
       




Table 1.7: Heterogeneous Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)     (9) 
























Treatment*Post*Group -0.432*** -0.187*** -0.134**       
 
(0.056) (0.040) (0.057)       
          
Treatment*Post    -0.028 -0.176*** -0.280*** -0.107* 0.139 -0.363*** 
    (0.082) (0.069) (0.080) (0.057) (0.193) (0.127) 
          
Country-Time Fixed Effect X X X       
Country-Group Fixed Effect X X X       
Group-Time Fixed Effect X X X       
Time Fixed Effect    X X X X X X 
Ln (Import Value) X X X X X X X X X 
Producer Heterogeneity X X X X X X X X X 
Country-Specific Month-of-Year Effect    X X X X X X 
Number of Observations 5880 3192 5712 4444 4704 4700 4704 2582 4696 
R-squared 0.0264 0.9112 0.0882 0.7085 0.3854 0.5356 0.3291 1.6111 0.8361 




Figures and Tables for Chapter Two 




Figure 2.2: Monthly Nominal USD/RMB (2000-2006) 
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 Table 2.1: The Top 5 Sophisticated Goods and the Bottom 5 Sophisticated Goods (U.S.$2000) 
  Product name   PRODY 2000 
Bottom 5 Vegetable products nes 739.67145 
 
Asses, mules, and hinnies, live 803.94128 
 
Sisal and agave, raw 822.37665 
 
Cloves (whole fruit, cloves, and stems) 866.57587 
 
Hand-made lace, in the piece, in strips or in motifs 901.80627 
   
Top 5 
Flat-rolled iron or non-alloy steel, coated with aluminium, width > 
600mm 50699.391 
 
Sheet piling of iron or steel 46986.039 
 
Sections H iron or non-alloy steel, nfw hot-roll/drawn/extruded > 80m 46242.609 
 
Tyre cord fabric of viscose rayon 46077.578 
  Cermets and articles thereof, waste or scrap 46058.699 






Table 2.2: Main Results 
Dependent Variable 
       1 




Ln (Export Similarity Index)                              









   Month-of-Year Fixed Effect 
 
X 
Year Fixed Effect 
 
X 
Number of Observations 4404 8525 
R-squared  0.0020 
Notes: Standard errors in Column 1 are bootstrapped; standard errors in Column 2 are 




















Placebo Test,  
2003 vs 2002 
 
Ln (Export Similarity Index) 
4 
U.S. Exports 








August*Year2005 0.001 0.017 -0.001    -0.049**  0.014* 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.022) (0.008) 
            
Month-of-Year Fixed Effect X  X X X 
Year Fixed Effect X  X X X 
Group-Month-of-Year Fixed Effect  X    
Group-year Fixed Effect  X    
Month-year Fixed Effect  X    
Number of Observations 3972 12497 8262 7015 8435 
R-squared 0.0074 0.0074 0.0015 0.0123 0.0017 
Notes: Standard errors in Column 1, 3, 4, 5, are clustered at the month level; standard errors in Column 2 are clustered at country-month level; standard 













within a Firm 
Ln (Export Similarity Index) 
August* Year 2005 0.015*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.005) (0.001) 
   Month-of-Year Fixed Effect X X 
Year Fixed Effect X X 
City Fixed Effect X  
Firm Fixed Effect  X 
Number of Observations 8516 120672 
R-squared 0.6311 0.8827 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the month level. Standard errors are reported in the 
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Table 3.1: Main Results 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable ∆ Output Share of SOEs 





Province-Year Fixed Effects X X 
∆ Ln(GDP per capita) X X 
∆ Gov Consumption/GDP X X 
∆ Ln(Dairy per Capita)*Post02 
 
X 


















Number of Observations 1813 1697 
R-squared 0.2184 0.2293 
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are reported in the parenthesis. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05. 
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Table 3.2: Robustness Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Variable ∆ Output Share of SOEs ∆ Privatization  ∆ Output Share of SOEs 
Specification 
Incl. City-linear 




and non-SOE  Pre-WTO Pure Exporters 
∆Tariff*Post02 -0.271** -0.295*** -0.306*** -0.293** -0.030  0.189 
 
(0.136) (0.110) (0.107) (0.146) (0.062)  (0.359) 
∆Tariff      -0.087  
      (0.297)  
Province-Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X X 
∆ Ln(GDP per capita) X X X X X X X 
∆ Gov Consumption/GDP X X X X X X X 
∆ Ln(Dairy per Capita)*Post02 X X X X X  X 
∆ Ln(Vegetable per Capita)*Post02 X X X X X  X 
∆ Ln(Telephone)*Post02 X X X X X  X 
∆ University*Post02 X X X X X  X 
∆ Coastal*Post02 X X X X X  X 
∆ Northern*Post02 X X X X X  X 
∆ Mountain*Post02 X X X X X  X 
City-Specific Linear Trend X       
∆ Ln(FDI)  X      
∆ Privatization 
 
 X     
Number of Observations 1697 1621 1482 1697 1482 721 1040 
R-squared 0.2761 0.2444 0.1994 0.2579 0.2591 0.3287 0.4182 
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are reported in the parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.3: Imports, Exports, and Imported Inputs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable ∆ Output Share of SOEs Imports 
∆Tariff*Post02 -0.344*** -0.240* -0.283** 0.991* 
 
(0.113) (0.125) (0.124) (0.563) 
∆Export Tariff*Post02 0.002  0.002  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
∆Input Tariff*Post02  -0.094 -0.094  





Province-Year Fixed Effects X X X X 
∆ Ln(GDP per capita) X X X X 
∆ Gov Consumption/GDP X X X X 
∆ Ln(Dairy per Capita)*Post02 X X X X 
∆ Ln(Vegetable per Capita)*Post02 X X X X 
∆ Ln(Telephone)*Post02 X X X X 
∆ University*Post02 X X X X 
∆ Coastal*Post02 X X X X 
∆ Northern*Post02 X X X X 
∆ Mountain*Post02 X X X X 
Number of Observations 1609 1697 1626 1224 
R-squared 0.2374 0.2295 0.2376  
Pseudo R2    0.9932 
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are reported in the parenthesis.  





Table 3.4: Intra- vs. Inter-Industry Reallocation 






∆ Tariff*Post02 -0.355*** -0.038*** 
 
(0.102) (0.013) 
   Province-Year Fixed Effects X X 
∆ Ln(GDP per capita) X X 
∆ Gov Consumption/GDP X X 
∆ Ln(Dairy per Capita)*Post02 X X 
∆ Ln(Vegetable per Capita)*Post02 X X 
∆ Ln(Telephone)*Post02 X X 
∆ University*Post02 X X 
∆ Coastal*Post02 X X 
∆ Northern*Post02 X X 
∆ Mountain*Post02 X X 
Number of Observations 1697 1697 
R-squared 0.2476 0.2293 
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are reported in the parenthesis. 




Table 3.5: Intensive vs. Extensive Margins, Overall 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Total Intensive Margin Extensive Margin 
Unit (billion RMB) SOEs non-SOEs SOEs non-SOEs SOEs non-SOEs 
2001 1,514 6,676 1,023 4,621 491 2,056 
2005 1,552 16,600 1,253 8,798 300 7,802 
       
∆ 38 9,924 230 4,177 -191 5,746 
 
2.51% 148.65% 22.48% 90.39% -38.90% 279.47% 
       Intensive/Extensive Margins 
  






 Table 3.6: Intensive vs. Extensive Margins, Regression Results 
 (1) (2) 
 
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin 





Province-Year Fixed Effect X X 
∆ Ln(GDP per capita) X X 
∆ Gov Consumption/GDP X X 
∆ Ln(Dairy per Capita)*Post02 X X 
∆ Ln(Vegetable per Capita)*Post02 X X 
∆ Ln(Telephone)*Post02 X X 
∆ University*Post02 X X 
∆ Coastal*Post02 X X 
∆ Northern*Post02 X X 
∆ Mountain*Post02 X X 
Number of Observations 248 240 
R-squared 0.2694 0.2162 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. *** p<0.01,  







 Table 3.7: Differential Exit Rates 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable SOE exit rate 































   Group dummies X X 
Province fixed effects X X 
ln(GDP per capita) X X 
gov consumption/gdp X X 
ln(dairy) X X 
ln(vegetable per capita) X X 
ln(telephone) X X 
university X X 
coast X X 
north X X 
mountain X X 
non-SOE exit rate X X 
SOE entry rate X X 
Number of Observations 1003 712 
R-squared 0.2291 0.4152 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. *** p<0.01, 














TFP Top 25% 0.22 0.31 0.47 
TFP 25%-50% 0.23 0.27 0.50 
TFP 50%-75% 0.28 0.26 0.46 
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Appendix 1 for Chapter One 
In this Appendix, we outline a partial equilibrium model to illustrate how an 
exogenous shock to exchange rate affects exporting behavior. Specifically, we 
extend Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)’s model to incorporate the role of 
exchange rate movement.
51
 There are totally 1N  countries, a Home 
country ( H ) and N foreign countries, indexed by  .,,1 Ni 
 
Each firm 
produces a unique variety, competes in the monopolistic-competition manner, 
and is indexed by its productivity level   that is drawn from a cumulative 
distribution function )(G . Without loss of generality, we look only at how 
the change in Home country’s exchange rate against foreign country i  affects 
its exports to that foreign country.
 
    The inverse demand function for a variety produced by firm 
 
from 
Home and exported to foreign country i  is:
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,)()( iiii Qqep                      (1.6) 
where )(ip  are FOB export prices in foreign country i  denominated in 
Home currency, respectively; ie  is the exchange rate of Foreign currency 
against Home currency (hence, an increase in ie  means an appreciation in 
Home currency against foreign country si' ); )(iq is the demand of variety 
                                               
51 Similar results regarding the effect of exchange rate on exports can be derived using 




52 This inverse demand function can be derived from the maximization of a quadratic linear 





  in foreign country i ; and 

dqQ ii )(  is the total demand in foreign 
country i . The demand parameters ,,,  and are all positive. 
    Profit maximization yields the following equilibrium FOB export price:
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 is the productivity threshold of exporting, that is, 
the level for which operating profits from foreign country i
 
are zero;   is 
the Home wage rate (denominated in Home currency); and 1i  is the 
iceberg trade cost between Home and foreign country i  (i.e., for every i
units shipped, only one unit arrives at the destination). For an active exporter 
  in Home, its export volume to foreign country i  is: 















 iii eq                    (1.8) 
    Hence, the aggregate export value iV  (denominated in Home currency) 
from Home to foreign country i  is the sum of all active individual exporters’ 
export revenues ( )()()( **  ii qpr  ), i.e., 






dGqpdGrV iii              (1.9) 
And the effect of the change in the exchange rate ie  
on the aggregate export 
value iV  is  
                                               
53 Here we abuse the term FOB price a little, because )(ip includes the trade cost i . In the 
gravity model of our empirical part, we control for 
i
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    

































       
(1.10) 
    The first term on the right-hand of Equation (1.10) represents the effect 
from continuing exporters (or the intensive-margin effect), which can be 
shown to be negative, i.e., 




















             (1.11) 















), both of which can be proved to 
be negative, i.e., 






e f f e c tq u a n t i t y
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            (1.12) 
    The second term on the right-hand of Equation (1.10) captures the 
extensive-margin effect, that is, the effect due to the change in the number of 
exporters, which is a monotonically decreasing function of *i . It can be 
proved that the productivity threshold of exporting *i is an increasing 
function of ie , i.e,  









                          (1.13) 
therefore, we have a negative extensive margin effect of a currency 
appreciation. 
    Combining Equations (1.11) and (1.13), we have 
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                           (1.14) 
that is, an appreciation in Home currency against foreign country si'  results 
in a decrease in aggregate export value for Home to foreign country i . 
    The intuition for Equation (1.14) is as follows. There is an incomplete 
pass-through of an exchange rate appreciation: Home exporters absorb 
partially the appreciation effect by lowering its FOB export prices, but final 
prices (denominated in foreign country si' currency) in foreign country i  
still increase, which consequently leads to a fall in the final demand. As a 
result, such incomplete pass-through reduces FOB export revenues that Home 
exporters can obtain in foreign country i , and hence decreases the aggregate 
export value to that country. Moreover, given that the reduction in export 








(least productive) exporters find it not profitable to sell in and hence choose to 
exit foreign country i , which further decreases the aggregate export value to 




Appendix 2 for Chapter Two 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Using (1), we can define the equilibrium entry ratio *m  to be the solution to 






























































































































































emH sn      (2.5) 
Note that   0,,,0 eH  if and only if 
                    .01
11221     eee              (2.6) 
Let ,1 x  and     .1121  exexexa     Hence, (2.6) holds if 
and only if   .0 xa   xa  is a parabola opening upward with 
  .011 1   eea   Hence, there are two positive roots to   ,0 xa  
and one is less than 1 and one is greater than 1. Since ,1  there is only one 
  satisfying    .11111    eee    Denote this value of  as .a  
So,   0,,,0 eH  holds if and only if .a   
    We now show that there exists a unique positive number mˆ defined as 

































 such that 0H  for mm ˆ , 
and 0H  for mm ˆ . Observe from (5) that 0H  if and only if 
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(2.7) 
the right-hand side of which is positive because .111     ee  The 





 e , because 




 e  The left-hand side of (7) strictly decreases 
in m  from 11   e  at 0m  to    11e  when .m  If 
,11   eG then 0H  for all ,0m  which contradicts that 
.00  matH  So, a   guarantees that .
11   eG  If ,11    eG  
then 0H  for all ,0m  and we also have 0F  for all .0m  In this 
case, equilibrium is such that 0sM  so that all firms are located in the 
North. To rule out this scenario, we must also impose that ,11    eG  
which is equivalent to  
  .011122   eee     
Again, let 1 x  and      xexeexx bb   .112    is a parabola 




























  ee 
then 1  is at the strictly increasing portion of the parabola. 
Since     0,01  xbb for all .1  So, we don’t need any extra 




  ee 




















  ee 

























 eeeee   In 
sum, we can define 
 




























 14               e4e1ee1e2,1max
















   11eG  for all .b   Let  ,,maxˆ biaii    where ai and bi  
are the values of a  and b  when i  . Also let  .ˆ,ˆmaxˆ 21     
Hence, when ,ˆ   
                    
,
1111 iiii eGe i
   
                 
(2.8) 
























  0,,,  iii emHH   for .ˆ imm   
    Now, denote  21max ˆ,ˆmaxˆ mmm   and  21min ˆ,ˆminˆ mmm  . Since 
,21 HHF   0F  for  minˆ,0 mm , and 0F  for   ,ˆ maxmm . By 
continuity, any equilibrium *m such that   0,* mF must be in 
 maxmin ˆ,ˆ mm . Moreover, if 
*m is unique, then we have 0/  mF  at *m . 
















    The rest of the proof proves the uniqueness of *m , and for this purpose, 
we use the Descartes’ rule of signs to show that there is exactly one positive 
root of .0F  Observe that 











   
       
       






















































     





























Since 0F  if and only if and only if ,023  DCmBmAm  it suffices 
to show that there is exactly one positive root to this polynomial. By (8), we 
know that  
  












































Hence, ,0,0  DA and 
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     





































































































































































   



































































































































































So, because   ii e     1122 11  and   .,11 122 CBe ii      To 
apply the rule of signs, distinguish three cases, ,0,0 BCBC  and 
.0 BC   Combined, with the facts that 0A  and ,0D  there is exactly 
one positive root in each case. Hence, *m  is unique. 















 if and only if  
    



















































































































































It is easy to verify that 1ˆ  e  by checking (6) and so 1e . Hence, the 















































Which is positive since .1e  From Proposition 1, ,0
de
dm


























































































































 is similar. 

















































If and only if 
              
 
 










































      
(2.9) 
We can first look at a special case where .1e  The only difference between 









mLL  With 1e and ,1m  it is easy to verify that (2.9) 
holds. This proves Point 2(a), let .sn LL   When 1,1  me  and (2.9) 





































Appendix 3 for Chapter Three 
 
 
Appendix Table 3.1: More Robustness Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




definition  Two-periods  
Employment








∆Tariff -0.277* -0.294** -0.187** -0.304*** -0.254** -0.265** -0.307*** 
 (0.147) (0.149) (0.085) (0.107) (0.123) (0.108) (0.112) 
        
Province-Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X X 
∆ Ln(GDP per capita) X X X X X X X 
∆ Gov Consumption/GDP X X X X X X X 
∆ Ln(Dairy per Capita)*Post02 X X X X X X X 
∆ Ln(Vegetable per Capita)*Post02 X X X X X X X 
∆ Ln(Telephone)*Post02 X X X X X X X 
∆ University*Post02 X X X X X X X 
∆ Coastal*Post02 X X X X X X X 
∆ Northern*Post02 X X X X X X X 
∆ Mountain*Post02 X X X X X X X 
Number of Observations 1697 252 1697 1697 1697 1697 1697 
R-squared 0.2707 0.3791 0.2387 0.2292 0.2220 0.1928 0.2289 
Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the city level, are reported in the parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
